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Abstract
This Comment seeks to analyze the OECD’s effort to curb tax competition. Section I of this
Comment provides background information of the emergence of international taxation and the re-
medial measures historically enacted to address global fiscal issues, notably double taxation. This
section will also outline the OECD’s emergence and role in international taxation issues. Further-
more, this section will discuss globalization and its contribution to the growth of preferential tax
regimes, thus facilitating the OECD’s remedial effort. Section II analyzes the OECD’s reports,
“Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue” (”1998 Report”) and ”Towards Global
Tax Co-operation: Progress in Identifying and Eliminating Harmful Tax Practices” (”2000 Re-
port”), which are the focal points of the OECD’s effort. Section III of this Comment argues that
the OECD’s effort to curb tax competition breaches international taxation principles by trespass-
ing on the fiscal authority of individual nations. Additionally, this effort deviates from traditional
measures utilized to remedy international fiscal issues, specifically double taxation, and will likely
result in stifling global economic development. This Comment concludes that the OECD’s ef-
fort to curb tax competition amounts to a monopolistic endeavor that economically discriminates
against developing nations.
COMMENT
THE GLOBAL SCHOOLYARD BULLY:
THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION
AND DEVELOPMENT'S COERCIVE EFFORTS
TO CONTROL TAX COMPETITION
Alexander Townsend, Jr. *
[T]he Organisation for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment's (OECD) effort to stamp out tax competition...
is designed in effect to create a tax cartel and, if the OECD
succeeds, our nation will face the risk of higher taxes and a
weakened economy while developing nations will be ham-
strung in their attempts to promote economic growth ....
Tax competition is a strong factor in both maintaining and
increasing the vibrancy of economies across the globe ....
The OECD is even trying to impose its will on nations that are
not members of the organization, calling for draconian sanc-
tions against so-called tax havens. This is troubling on several
levels. Sovereign nations should be free to determine their
own tax policies.., and it hardly seems right for us to partici-
pate in a campaign to force other nations to change their tax
laws.'
INTRODUCTION
The United States Sherman Antitrust Act attempts to limit
an enterprise from being able to acquire or maintain monopoly
power.2 Two elements illustrate monopoly power: possessing a
monopoly in a certain market and willfully acquiring or main-
taining that monopoly.3 Contextual analysis of this anticompeti-
* Fordham Int'l L.J., Special Publications Editor, J.D. Candidate, May 2002, Ford-
ham University School of Law. I would like to thank those who inspired the production
of, and assisted in the publication of, this Comment.
1. Letter from Rep. Richard K. Armey, Congress of the United States, House of
Representatives, to Lawrence Summers, United States Department of Treasury, TAx
NOTEs TODAY, Sept. 7, 2000.
2. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). "Every person who shall monopolize, or combine or con-
spire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of trade or commerce
... shall be deemed guilty of a felony .... " Id.
3. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (stating that
threshold questions are whether monopoly exists in relevant market and whether an-
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tive conduct seeks to determine whether such conduct is exclu-
sionary without any valid reason.4
Numerous historical cases have focused on and analyzed
abuses of monopoly power under the Sherman Antitrust Act.5
For example, Microsoft recently was found engaging in anticom-
petitive, exclusionary conduct in maintaining its monopoly in
the personal computer operating system market.6 Additionally,
American Telephone and Telegraph ("AT&T") was found prac-
ticing anticompetitive conduct in long distance telephone ser-
vice. 7 The Aluminum Company of America ("ALCOA") was also
found engaging in anticompetitive conduct in establishing and
maintaining its monopoly in the aluminum industry.'
Although there is no international equivalent to the Sher-
man Antitrust Act,9 the conduct constituting monopolistic be-
ticompetitive methods are utilized to maintain or establish that monopoly); see also
United States v. AT&T Co., 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1347-48 (D.D.C. 1981) (asserting that
rebuttable presumption of monopoly power arises through existence of dominant mar-
ket share maintained by barriers to entry to such market); S. Pac. Communications Co.
v. AT&T Co., 740 F.2d 980, 1001-02 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (approving rebuttable presump-
tion standard of monopoly existence set forth in AT&T Co., 524 F. Supp. at 1347-48).
4. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 483 (1992)
(stating that liability is determined on whether legitimate reasons justify corporate ac-
tion).
5. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Identifying Monopolists' Illegal Conduct Under The Sher-
man Act, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 809, 810 (2000) (noting significant antitrust cases against
Aluminum Co. of America, IBM, AT&T, and Standard Oil Co. identifying monopolistic
conduct and establishing principles underlying antitrust regulation).
6. See United States et al. v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 19-24 (1999) (find-
ing that Microsoft's dominant market share of personal computer operating system dis-
suaded consumers from using another manufacturer's operating system and induced
independent software vendors to write software applications "first and foremost" for
Microsoft's product).
7. See United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 140-42 (D.D.C. 1982) (outlin-
ing consent decree, that AT&T agreed to, separating Bell operating companies from
AT&T after acknowledging AT&T's monopolistic conduct in leveraging their domi-
nance in long distance service to control market for local phone services).
8. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 431-44 (2d Cir. 1945)
(determining that ALCOA, because of their inherent experience, trade connections,
and personnel, engaged in exclusive contracts with suppliers and unfair pricing that
unfairly excluded competitors from aluminum market).
9. See Andrew T. Guzman, Is InternationalAntitrust Possible?, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1501,
1502-03 (1998) (stating that international agreement regarding national antitrust laws
is non-existent, but may be in line for future consideration); see alsoJohn T. Soma &
Eric K. Weingarten, Multinational Economic Network Effects and the Need for an International
Antitrust Response from the World Trade Organization: A Case Study in Broadcast-Media and
News Corporation, 21 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 41, 42-43 (2000) (stating that increase in
international transactions yield current nation-based antitrust regulation inefficient,
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havior in the preceding cases is similar to the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development's ° ("OECD") effort"
to curb tax competition.12 Many nations around the world pro-
vide favorable tax rates to individuals and corporations to induce
investment.1 3 The OECD seeks to reform the tax systems of
these tax competitive nations and curb the resulting movement
of capital into these jurisdictions.14 At least one commentator
notes that because the members of the OECD are among the
most industrialized nations in the world, wielding significant ec-
onomic power in the form of goods, services, and capital,' 5 these
causing need to establish global cooperative antitrust regulation); Nina Hachigian, Es-
sential Mutual Assistance in International Antitrust Enforcement, 29 INT'L LAW. 117, 117-18
(1995) (stating that businesses are becoming more international, causing need for new
international focus in antitrust enforcement).
10. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD"),
About OECD, at http://www.OECD.org/about.htm [hereinafter OECD site] (defining
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD") and identifying
its member nations). The Organisation for European Economic Co-operation
("OEEC") was formed shortly after World War II to assist Europe with economic recov-
ery. Id. Following completion of this effort, the Organisation for Economic Co-opera-
tion and Development ("OECD") emerged in 1961 as successor to the OEEC to focus
on global economic development. Id. Currently, the OECD is comprised of 29 coun-
tries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico,
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Id.
11. See OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE 9 (1998)
[hereinafter 1998 REPORT] (stating need for governments to cooperatively identify tax
havens and other harmful tax regimes and provide guidelines to eliminate these prac-
tices); see also OECD, TOwARDs GLOBAL TAx CO-OPERATION: PROGRESS IN IDENTIFYING
AND ELIMINATING HARMFUL TAx PRACTICES (2000) [hereinafter 2000 REPORT] (identify-
ing harmful tax practices and publishing defensive measures to counter practices of
these jurisdictions).
12. See Julie Roin, Competition and Evasion: Another Perspective on International Tax
Competition, 89 GEO. L.J. 543, 546 (2001) (noting that tax competition occurs when one
nation attracts foreign investment within its borders by offering more favorable tax
treatment on income generated from such investments than taxpayer's resident na-
tion); see also Karen B. Brown, Harmful Tax Competition: The OECD View, 32 GEO. WASH.
J. INT'L L. & ECON. 311, 314 (1999) (noting that tax competition occurs when nations
provide special tax benefits, such as low or no tax rates, to certain types of income, such
as income generated from foreign investment).
13. See 1998 REPORT, supra note 11, at 13-14 (noting that targeted jurisdictions typi-
cally have no or low tax rates that induce investment of foreign capital).
14. See id. at 17 (stating that intention of effort is to address issues raised by tax
practices that distort location of capital and services).
15. See OECD site, supra note 10 (stating that two-thirds of world's goods and ser-
vices are produced by OECD member nations); see also James Salzman, Labor Rights,
Globalization and Institutions: The Role and Influence of the Organization for Economic Cooper-
ation and Development, 21 MICH.J. INT'L L. 769, 776 (2000) (stating that OECD allows for
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nations are leveraging such dominant economic influence to
force smaller developing nations to alter their respective tax
laws, thus extending the OECD's monopoly into the area of taxa-
tion and continuing its domination of the global economy. 6
This Comment seeks to analyze the OECD's effort to curb
tax competition. Section I of this Comment provides back-
ground information of the emergence of international taxation
and the remedial measures historically enacted to address global
fiscal issues, notably double taxation. This section will also out-
line the OECD's emergence and role in international taxation
issues. Furthermore, this section will discuss globalization and
its contribution to the growth of preferential tax regimes, thus
facilitating the OECD's remedial effort. Section II analyzes the
OECD's reports, "Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging
Global Issue" ("1998 Report") and "Towards Global Tax Co-op-
eration: Progress in Identifying and Eliminating Harmful Tax
Practices" ("2000 Report"), which are the focal points of the
OECD's effort. Section III of this Comment argues that the
OECD's effort to curb tax competition breaches international
taxation principles by trespassing on the fiscal authority of indi-
vidual nations. Additionally, this effort deviates from traditional
measures utilized to remedy international fiscal issues, specifi-
cally double taxation, and will likely result in stifling global eco-
nomic development. This Comment concludes that the OECD's
effort to curb tax competition amounts to a monopolistic en-
deavor that economically discriminates against developing na-
tions.
wealthy, industrialized governments to coordinate domestic and international policies);
Arthur J. Cockfield, Tax Integration Under NAFTA: Resolving the Conflict Between Economic
and Sovereignty Interests, 34 STAN. J. INT'L L. 39, 44 (1998) (stating that OECD's largest
member, United States, accounts for one-third of total global capital market); United
States Census Bureau, U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services Highlights, at http://
www.census.gov/indicator/www/ustrade.html (Feb. 21, 2001) (indicating that U.S. ex-
ports increased in 2000 to over US$1,068,400,000,000, more than any other nation).
16. See George M. Melo, Taxation in the Global Arena: Preventing the Erosion of Na-
tional Tax Bases or Impinging on Territorial Sovereignty?, 12 PACE INT'L L. REv. 183, 205
(2000) (asserting OECD's utilization of tax and non-tax measures to combat harmful
tax competition results from power inequality between economically powerful OECD
nations and economically weaker developing nations); see also Brown, supra note 12, at
314-15 (noting that OECD nations unilaterally seek to alter tax policies of developing
nations to continue dominance of their multinational corporations); Mitchell B. Weiss,
International Tax Competition: An Efficient or Inefficient Phenomenon?, 16 AKRON TAx J. 99,
126-28 (2001) (asserting that OECD's effort against tax competition will result in global
tax "cartel," thus strengthening OECD's current dominance in global economy).
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I. THE CONFRONTATION: TAXATION AND THE OECD IN
THE FACE OF GLOBAL CHANGE
Historically, fiscal legislation was a national issue with exclu-
sively domestic implications.' 7 Increasing transnational eco-
nomic relations, however, challenged this nation-centered ap-
proach by introducing the potential for double taxation. 8 This
resulted in a cooperative effort between nations and multina-
tional organizations, such as the OECD, to establish remedial
principles and guidelines. 9 Currently, the OECD seeks to ad-
dress the growing issue of tax competition, which is facilitated by
another trend: globalization. 20
A. National Fiscal Sovereignty
Experts agree that the authority to tax is fundamental to any
government because inherent in this authority is a sovereign's
ability to effectively govern its territory. 21 A nation's fiscal system
17. See Stephen G. Utz, Tax Harmonization and Coordination in Europe and America, 9
CONN. J. INT'L L. 767, 767-68 (1994) (stating that traditional tax policy was based on
national economic systems that rarely affected each other).
18. See OECD, 1992 Model Double Tax Convention, available at http://www.oecd.org/
daf/fa/treaties/treaty.htm (defining international double taxation as imposition of
taxes by two or more nations against same income generated by single taxpayer in for-
eign country). A taxpayer could be subjected to taxation by his or her resident country
and by a foreign country where such income was generated. Id.; see also ARNOLD A.
KNECHTLE, BASIC PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL FISCAL LAw 10, 34-42 (W.E. Weisflog
trans., Kluwer 1979) (noting that multiple taxation, or double taxation, had emerged as
most notable fiscal problem of increasing economic relations between nations); ADRIAN
OGLEY, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL TAX: A MULTINATIONAL PERSPECTrVE 1-2
(1993) (noting that increase in international trade resulted in problem of double taxa-
tion).
19. See FREDERICK BASSINGER & MICHEL GLAUTIER, A REFERENCE GUIDE TO INTERNA-
TIONAL TAXATION 160 (1987) (noting that OECD and United Nations ("U.N.") pub-
lished model agreements to aid nations in their respective negotiations to eliminate
double taxation).
20. See Roman Terrill, Wat Does 'Globalization'Mean ?, 9 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBs. 217, 218 (1999) (defining globalization as diminished economic significance of
national borders and governments brought about by increased trade, technological in-
novations, and increased cross-border capital flow primarily proliferated by multina-
tional corporations). Unlike the previous cross-border transactions of internationaliza-
tion, globalization emphasizes an increase of private cross-border transactions at the
expense of diminished governmental involvement in national economic affairs. Id.
21. See M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 428 (1819) (stating that authority to
tax is essential to very existence and operation of government); see also BASSINGER &
GLAUTIER, supra note 19, at xi (acknowledging that historically governments stressed
importance of revenue for raising and maintaining armies, and obtaining allegiance of
its subjects and that weakened sovereigns lost control when ability to tax ceased); FRAN-
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provides revenue for the establishment and improvement of na-
tional defense systems and necessary public services infrastruc-
ture.22 Thus, tax policy is an effective method for governments
to address their nation's basic structural needs.23
A nation's taxing authority exists only within its jurisdiction,
and within its jurisdiction a nation uses its authority to levy and
collect taxes from individuals and entities.24 Historically, a na-
tion's geographic boundaries defined its jurisdiction and the ex-
tent of its authority.25 Thus, scholars traditionally view taxation
as a national right due to its national importance and its jurisdic-
21tional emergence.
B. Internationalization and Its Impact on Traditional Taxation
The proliferation of cross-border economic activities intro-
duced new problems to nations drafting their respective fiscal
legislation. 27  Internationalization 28 made people question the
traditional notion of absolute domestic fiscal sovereignty. 29 As a
result, a cooperative approach to address internationalization
CEs HILLIARD, THE LAW OF TAXATION Vi (Fred B. Rothman & Co., 1997) (1875) (stating
that taxation is means of support for political government).
22. See HILLIARD, supra note 21, at 9-12 (stating that governments levy taxes to
maintain military and public services).
23. See Reuven Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the
Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REv. 1573, 1626 (2000) (asserting that tax policies approved
by nation's citizens reflect society and quality of life that citizens prefer); see also
Cockfield, supra note 15, at 50 (stating importance of tax legislation as policy tool used
to satisfy specific needs of each nation's citizens).
24. See R.R. v. Pa., 15 Wall. 300, 319 (1872) (stating that taxation authority is con-
fined to subjects within national jurisdiction); see also Utz, supra note 17, at 772 (stating
that most nations claim authority to tax people, property, and transactions within their
borders).
25. See BASSINGER & GLAUTIER, supra note 19, at xi (stating that jurisdiction ex-
tended to "geographical boundaries," which defined nation's territory under interna-
tional norms).
26. See Utz, supra note 17, at 772 (stating that nations tax based on traditional legal
norms regarding sovereigns and their authority over people and entities within their
borders); see also BASSINGER & GLAUTIER, supra note 19, at x, xi (stating that historically,
taxation authority is national in character).
27. See KNECHTLE, supra note 18, at 9 (stating that proliferating international trade
spawned tax competition and multiple taxation).
28. See THOMAS C. FISCHER, THE UNITED STATES, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND THE
"GLOBALIZATION" OF WORLD TRADE: ALLIES OR ADVERSARIES? 4 (2000) (defining interna-
tionalization as increased economic interactivity between nations in their free-standing
capacities).
29. See RUTSEL SILVESTRE J. MARTHA, THE JURISDICTION TO TAX IN INTERNATIONAL
LAw: THEORY AND PRACTICE OF LEGISLATIVE FISCAL JURISDICTION 11 (1989) (stating that
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emerged. 0
1. Double Taxation
Critics assert that increased economic activities between na-
tions has altered domestic fiscal legislation.3 1 Geographic juris-
dictional boundaries failed to address fiscal issues associated with
the increasing number of persons and firms generating foreign-
based income from transactions in other countries.3 2 Conse-
quently, nations modified their jurisdictional reach to enable
taxation of persons and entities via an appropriate fiscal attach-
ment:38 personal, territorial, or functional.3 4
Taxpayers extending their operations into other jurisdic-
tions, however, potentially subjected themselves to double taxa-
tion.35 A taxpayer's country of residence claimed authority to
tax the taxpayer's foreign-sourced income, while the country in
internationalization of trade and increasing mobility of persons and capital resulted in
assessment of impact of international law in fiscal law).
30. See THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW OF TAXATION: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS
126-43 (Asif H. Qureshi ed., 1994) [hereinafter PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW] (noting
importance of Vienna Convention, OECD, and U.N. in facilitating negotiations among
nations and resulting execution and interpretation of subsequent treaty agreements).
31. See MARTHA, supra note 29, at 11 (stating that increased cross-border direct
investment and trade and increased number of people living abroad were contributing
factors to need for fiscal reform); see also BASSINGER & GLAUTIER, supra note 19, at xii
(noting that expansion of international trade altered tax strategies adopted by nations
in effort to deter or encourage foreign investment); KNECHTLE, supra note 18, at 9-10
(stating that increased cross-border movements established need to modify tax systems
to address new fiscal issues).
32. See KNECHTLE, supra note 18, at 36 (asserting that nations sought to extend
authority because of taxpayers generating increasing amounts of global income outside
reach of traditional territorial sovereignty).
33. See id. at 35 (noting that fiscal attachment is legal relationship giving rise to
taxation authority); see also Robert L. Palmer, Toward Unilateral Coherence in Determining
Jurisdiction to Tax Income, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 4 (1989) (stating that nations exercise
jurisdictional enforcement of taxation based on specific relationships, such as personal
or economic, between themselves and potential taxpayers).
34. See MARTHA, supra note 29, at 43-46 (defining types of fiscal authority). Per-
sonal sovereignty refers to State authority over its own citizens. Id. at 43. Territorial
sovereignty refers to State authority over all persons and entities within its territory. Id.
at 45. Functional sovereignty refers to situations where events occur in "stateless" do-
mains, such as seas or oceans. Id.
35. See Palmer, supra note 33, at 5-6 (noting that taxpayers generating income in
foreign countries were caught between nation of residence, seeking to tax its citizen,
and nation of income source, seeking to tax based on its economic relationship to gen-
erated income); see alsoJulie Roin, Rethinking Tax Treaties in a Strategic World with Dispa-
rate Tax Systems, 81 VA. L. Rxv. 1753, 1759 (1995) (noting that taxpayer-resident nation
and income-source nation debated over taxing authority of generated income).
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which the income was generated also claimed authority to tax
revenue.36 Additionally, situations arose where a third country
claimed taxing authority if a taxpayer maintained citizenship in
one country, resided in a second country, and transacted busi-
ness in a third country.37
Absent an agreement to alleviate double taxation, few inter-
national transactions would occur, because the excessive tax bur-
den would render most transactions economically unfeasible.
Remedying double taxation requires the cooperation of multiple
nations.39 Consequently, internationalization challenged the
traditional notion of absolute fiscal sovereignty.4 °
2. Questioning Absolute Fiscal Authority
Historically, international law and fiscal law developed inde-
pendently of each other.4' Internationalization, however,
spawned an academic debate regarding the effect of interna-
tional considerations on national fiscal sovereignty.42 Some
scholars believe that nations could no longer develop their re-
spective fiscal legislation in a vacuum and were limited because
36. See OGLEY, supra note 18, at 31 (explaining debate that arose among nations
over authority to tax specified income).
37. See Roin, supra note 35, at 1759 (stating that country of residence, country of
citizenship, and country where income is derived can all feasibly claim authority to tax
such income); see also BASSINGER & GLAUTIER, supra note 19, at 151 (stating that taxpay-
ers could face triple taxation: taxes from country of citizenship, residence country, and
country where income is generated).
38. See Roin, supra note 35, at 1760 (stating that taxpayers would be unable to
retain enough profit to make international transactions economically worthwhile).
39. See Tsilly Dagan, The Tax Treaties Myth, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 939, 941
(2000) (noting that conventional account of double taxation redress emphasizes mu-
tual cooperation among nations); see also Robert Thornton Smith, Tax Treaty Interpreta-
tion &y the Judiciary, 49 TAx LAW. 845, 845-46 (1996) (explaining intention of double
taxation treaties and mechanism by which contracting nations agree to remedial
scheme); PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 30, at 126-27 (noting that effective
remedial double taxation treaties require negotiation among various nations).
40. See Utz, supra note 17, at 767 (stating that nineteenth-century-based nation-
centered tax systems needed to account for global economic integration).
41. See MARTHA, supra note 29, at 11 (stating that this development resulted from
international lawyers lacking interest in fiscal matters and concurrently diminishing
role of analytical study of international law).
42. See id. (noting that emergence or increase of certain economic activity high-
lights previously undeveloped area of law); see also TiMo VIRENKENTTA, TAX INCENTIVES
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: A STUDY ON THE RELATION-
SHIP BETWEEN INCOME TAX INCENTIVES FOR INWARD FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES AND TAXATION OF FOREIGN INCOME IN CAPITAL-EXPORTING COUNTRIES 43
(1991) (noting that extent of national fiscal sovereignty became subject of controversy).
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of the increasing effect national tax systems had on international
economic relations.43
Subsequently, most commentators acknowledged the global
economic impact of a nation's tax system.44 Most scholars, how-
ever, concluded that no international law limits the authority of
nations to prescribe their respective fiscal legislations.45 Schol-
ars yield significant influence as a source of international law,
and so their concurrence regarding state sovereignty became de-
terminant on the legal outcome.4 6 Consequently, nations main-
tained their autonomous role in developing fiscal legislation and
have refused to relinquish their authority.
47
43. See MARTHA, supra note 29, at 11-14 (noting emerging academic debate regard-
ing limitations international considerations placed on fiscal legislation); see also Utz,
supra note 17, at 770 (noting common belief that domestic taxes affect international
business and are not independent of competitive condition in other countries, thus
domestic models must accordingly be transnational).
44. See MARTHA, supra note 29, at 12-18 (noting that commentators have identified
resulting international implications of state legislation); see also Palmer, supra note 33, at
20 (asserting that modifications in nation's fiscal policy can negatively affect fiscal pol-
icy of another nation, causing subsequent change in such nation's policy).
45. See MARTHA, supra note 29, at 16 (noting that no prohibition from interna-
tional law appears to be axiom for fiscalists); see also KNECHTLE, supra note 18, at 34
(stating that state's fiscal sovereignty is unlimited over persons and objects within its
jurisdiction); PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 30, at 24 (stating acceptance of
nation's right to tax pursuant to their respective jurisdiction is not limited by interna-
tional law).
46. See PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 30, at 23 (noting that writings of
experts had determinative role as source of law in international law); see alsoJianming
Shen, The Basis of International Law: Why Nations Observe, 17 DICK. J. INT'L L. 287, 291-94,
309-11 (1999) (noting that reformation and development of international law was
largely impacted by works of Alberico Gentilis, Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes, John
Locke, Francisco de Vitoria, Richard Zouche, and other scholars); John W. Head, Su-
pranational Law: How the Move Toward Multilateral Solutions is Changing the Character of
"International" Law, 42 U. KAN. L. REv. 605, 614-18 (1994) (acknowledging influential
contributions of Hugo Grotius, Francisco Suarez, Vattel, and other scholars in develop-
ment of international law).
47. See Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age of Globalization, 98 MICH. L. Rxv.
167, 167-68 (1999) (stating that international relations are based on still-prevailing no-
tion that nations are independent actors engaging in international transactions); see also
Cockfield, supra note 15, at 54 (alleging that national desire to maintain tax sovereignty
has been factor in difficulties encountered in attempted European tax harmonization);
Robert A. Green, The Future of Source-Based Taxation of the Income of Multinational Enter-
prises, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 18, 64 (1993) (asserting that eliminating tax competition by
harmonizing tax rates would be very difficult to accomplish because it would require
countries surrendering great deal of fiscal sovereignty); Avi-Yonah, supra note 23, at
1629 (asserting that countries are hesitant to give up their right to establish national tax
rates since such right is fundamental to their sovereignty); BASSINGER & GLAUTIER, supra
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3. Emergence of International Taxation
Mounting fiscal problems of internationalization, most no-
tably double taxation, required immediate remedial measures. 48
Adhering to the principle that authority to tax exists at the na-
tional level, it became necessary for nations to devise a coopera-
tive multinational approach that would be acceptable to all af-
fected nations. 49  Thus, the area of international taxation
emerged.5 °
Scholars describe international taxation as a misleading
term, because no body of international statutory fiscal law ex-
ists." Nations maintain unequivocal authority regarding tax leg-
islation within their respective jurisdictions. 52 Thus, interna-
tional taxation refers to the interaction of conflicting tax systems
and the methods by which problems resulting from this interac-
note 19, at xi (asserting that ... nations jealously protect their right to tax persons and
objects within their jurisdiction).
48. See OGLEY, supra note 18, at 1 (noting that during early part of twentieth cen-
tury, double taxation became more significant and was subject of numerous studies by
League of Nations and other multinational organizations); see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah,
The Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal For Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REv. 1301,
1303 (1996) (stating that League of Nations sought to eliminate growing problem of
double taxation in 1920s).
49. See BASSINGER & GLAUTIER, supra note 19, at 159-60 (stating that countries
sought to resolve double taxation via negotiated agreements); see also Arthur J.
Cockfield, Balancing National Interests in the Taxation of Electronic Commerce Business Profits,
74 TUL. L. Rv. 133, 143 (1999) (noting that negotiated agreements represent compro-
mise among various nations to address fiscal issues).
50. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 48, at 1303 (noting that "coherent international tax
regime" was developed in 1920s following League of Nations study of ways to avoid
international double taxation).
51. See BASSINGER & GLAUTIER, supra note 19, at xii (defining international taxation
as structure-less legal development arising from expansion of international trade); see
also Benjamin R. Hartman, Coercing Cooperation From Offshore Financial Centers: Identity
and Coincidence of International Obligations Against Money Laundering and Harmful Tax
Competition, 24 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 253, 280 (2001) (acknowledging failure of
consensus among nations that resulted in lack of international customary guidelines
regarding taxation); Adrian J. Sawyer, A Comparison of New Zealand Taxpayers'Rights with
Selected Civil Law and Common Law Countries-Have New Zealand Taxpayers Been "Short-
Changed"7, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1345, 1349 (1999) (noting that adherence to na-
tional sovereignty yields differing fiscal legislation among nations).
52. See Roin, supra note 12, at 597 (asserting that nations consider fiscal policy
sovereign right and attempts to achieve international uniformity in fiscal policy in-
fringes on such sovereign right); Damian Laurey, Reexamining U.S. Tax Sparing Policy
with Developing Countries: The Merits of Falling in Line with International Norms, 20 VA. TAX
REV. 467, 471 (2000) (noting nations' adherence to sovereign right to tax income gen-
erated within its jurisdiction); Palmer, supra note 33, at 4 (asserting that nations have
unequivocal discretion in structuring and enforcing their fiscal policies).
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tion are addressed.5 3
A system of international treaty agreements arose, which
even today, remains the framework of international taxation.
Multiple nations could negotiate the terms of an agreement and,
upon completion, expect full compliance by all signatory na-
tions.5' This allows for remedial measures to international fiscal
issues without usurping the fiscal sovereignty of each nation.56
Academics, nations, international organizations, and regula-
tory bodies commonly acknowledge treaties as being very effec-
tive in preventing double taxation.57 Signatory nations could
agree on a maximum tax level and how the total tax should be
allocated among each signatory nation.58 Typically, the resident
country allows for an exemption or a credit to the taxpayer for
tax paid on income in another country. 9
53. See BASSINGER & GLAUTIER, supra note 19, at xii (asserting that concept of inter-
national taxation is system of conflict rules used to address international fiscal issues
and preserve national sovereignty); see also KNECHTLE, supra note 18, at 61 (stating that
international taxation is merely system of conflict rules to remedy fiscal issues by use of
multilateral treaties).
54. See PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 30, at 127 (asserting that interna-
tional taxation policies are defined in multilateral treaties); see also Hartman, supra note
51, at 280 (noting that negotiating bilateral treaties is only international tax practice
accepted by nations); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Income Tax Discrimination Against International
Commerce, 54 TAX L. REV. 131, 140 (2001) (acknowledging that international tax regime
is composed solely of bilateral treaties).
55. See PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 30, at 126-27 (asserting that valid
treaty is binding on signatory nations and must be adhered to in good faith).
56. See id. (stating that all signatories to agreement must consent to and comply
with its terms); see also Benvenisti, supra note 47, at 185 (stating that international treaty
agreements require national ratification); John F. Avery Jones, Are Tax Treaties Neces-
sary?, 53 TAx L. REV. 1, 3 (1999) (stating that treaty characteristic is nations' desire to
maintain sovereignty through negotiating position); Cockfield, supra note 49, at 143
(stating that tax treaties merely modify existing national tax rules); Hartman, supra note
51, at 254 (asserting that global financial issues, including fiscal policy, traditionally
focus on consensual agreement among nations).
57. See Dagan, supra note 39, 942-44 (stating that comments by American Law Insti-
tute and OECD among others emphasize importance and effectiveness of treaties to
prevent double taxation and eliminate consequential barriers to trade, thus facilitating
international trade and investment); see also Thornton Smith, supra note 39, at 845 (stat-
ing that in 1921 League of Nations recognized importance of treaties in eliminating
double taxation);Jones, supra note 56, at 2-3 (stating that success of tax treaties is illus-
trated by treaty proliferation during last 50 years).
58. Ogley, supra note 18, at 31.
59. See id. at 32-35 (noting that treaty structure dictates method used between sig-
natory nations to prevent double taxation); see also Thornton Smith, supra note 39, at
845-46 (noting that residence jurisdiction grants exemption or credit to taxpayer for tax
paid on foreign-source income).
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Tax treaties are also used to prevent tax evasion.6" These
agreements generally provide for mutual assistance between the
signatory nations on information sharing and enforcement.6"
Additionally, these agreements include resolution methods for
tax disputes to address international enforcement issues.62 Na-
tions entering into these arrangements contribute to the intangi-
ble benefits of improved foreign relations and increased clarity
for non-resident investors of another country's tax system and
administration.63
Unlike the widespread use and beneficial results of double
taxation treaties, tax evasion treaties have not been as success-
ful.64 Developing countries refused to enter into tax evasion
treaties because of the unilateral harm they receive due to de-
creased tax revenue and resulting lack of offsetting invest-
ments.6" Some developing nations have requested agreements
calling for tax-sparing arrangements,66 which would enable de-
veloping countries to maintain desirable levels of tax revenue
60. See Dagan, supra note 39, at 984 (stating that tax treaties provide mechanism
for international cooperation against tax evasion); see also Thornton Smith, supra note
39, at 845 (stating that main purposes of tax treaties are to alleviate double taxation and
to prevent tax evasion).
61. See Dagan, supra note 39, at 985 (stating that collection and information assis-
tance helps resident country collect taxes from income generated in other signatory
countries by making resident country aware of generated income and requiring source
countries to enforce resident country tax laws).
62. See PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 30, at 347 (stating that international
agreements provide for mechanisms to settle tax disputes that arise between national
tax authorities or between tax authority and taxpayer).
63. See Dagan, supra note 39, at 986 (stating that treaties show good faith of con-
tracting countries and can clarify tax rules and provide administrative assistance, which
may increase desirability of investments by non-residents).
64. See id. (noting success of double tax agreements while tax evasion agreements
have not been as effective).
65. See id. (stating reluctance of developing countries to enter into treaties with
developed nations because of diminished revenues that result from decreased non-resi-
dent investment because developing nation imposes another country's tax rate); see also
Laurey, supra note 52, at 471 (acknowledging developing nations' reluctance to enter
into traditional tax evasion treaties with developed nations because developing nations
receive much smaller reciprocal benefit as lower amounts of income are generated by
their companies in developed nations compared with much greater income generated
by companies of developed nations investing in developing nations).
66. See Dagan, supra note 39, at 993 (explaining tax-sparing arrangements). Tax-
sparing arrangements provide residents of developed nations with credits against taxes
that would have been payable to developing country for income generated in that de-
veloping country but is waived because of developing country's special treatment given
to such income. Id. These agreements between nations allow for developing nations to
maintain appeal for non-resident investment because of favorable tax treatment. Id.; see
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and non-resident investment.67 This request is not often recog-
nized by the United States, the most prolific treaty nation.68
C. OECD
Formed in an effort to represent the concerns of its mem-
ber nations, the OECD is rapidly transforming itself into a global
consultant.69 In the area of international taxation, the OECD
made a major contribution to the alleviation of double taxation
with its Model Double Tax Convention of 197770 ("OECD
Model"), which served as a template for subsequent treaties.
Additionally, the OECD has addressed an increasing range of
issues within the area of international taxation. 72
1. Background
As the successor to the Organisation for European Eco-
nomic Cooperation,73 ("OEEC") the OECD's mission is to
strengthen the economies of its member countries, improve the
also BASSINGER & GLAUTIER, supra note 19, at 160 (asserting that tax-sparing agreements
are important fiscal policy for developing countries).
67. See Dagan, supra note 39, at 993-94 (stating that tax-sparing arrangements
would make treaties more beneficial to developing nations); see also Laurey, supra note
52, at 470, 483 (noting that tax-sparing provisions facilitate ability of developing nations
to implement tax holiday, whereby tax on income generated by foreign investments are
reduced or eliminated, thus attracting foreign capital).
68. See Dagan, supra note 39, at 993-94 (stating that although some developed
countries have agreed to tax-sparing arrangements, United States has consistently re-
fused to grant such assistance); see also Roin, supra note 12, at 547 (acknowledging that
U.S. Senate rarely ratifies treaties containing tax-sparing provisions); Laurey, supra note
52, at 471 (noting that United States has deemed tax-sparing provisions inconsistent
with its main tax policy of alleviating double taxation); Brown, supra note 12, at 321
(asserting that economically weak developing nations are supported by foreign aid and
debt obligations from developed nations in lieu of tax-sparing assistance).
69. See OECD site, supra note 10 (noting OECD's initial focus on economic devel-
opment of its member nations).
70. See OECD, Model Tax Convention, available at http://www.OECD.org/daf/fa/
treaties/treaty.htm (explaining OECD Model Tax Convention ("OECD Model") struc-
ture and purpose in alleviating double taxation).
71. See PHILIP BAKER, DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL TAX
LAw 4 (1994) (stating that OECD Model was basis for negotiating double taxation
agreements); see also Thornton Smith, supra note 39, at 845 (stating that OECD Model
has served as principal basis for treaty negotiations among developed nations); BAS-
SINGER & GLAUTIER, supra note 19, at 160-61 (noting model agreements developed by
OECD contributed to proliferation of treaty agreements).
72. See OECD site, supra note 10 (stating that OECD has addressed transfer pric-
ing, e-commerce, and corruption, among other issues).
73. See id. (stating that OEEC was formed under Marshall Plan to administer North
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efficiency of market systems, and contribute to free trade expan-
sion between both industrialized and developing nations.7 4 Ini-
tially focusing on its member countries and their respective poli-
cies, the OECD has altered its focus to advising emerging market
economies and analyzing the impact of the increasing interac-
tion of various policies across the world.75 Ultimately, the OECD
aims to increase its membership and broaden its scope to inter-
connect various economies into a unified global economic sys-
tem.76
The OECD also plays an important role in non-economic
issues. 77 By providing a venue for the governments of industrial-
ized nations to meet, the OECD plays a significant role in struc-
turing global governance by promulgating legislative instru-
ments.78 As a prolific research institution, the OECD provides
data, forecasts, and policy options addressing various social con-
cerns.79 The OECD maintains an interdisciplinary approach in
addressing these non-economic issues, however, by focusing on
the economic impacts of these various areas.8 °
American aid for European reconstruction following World War II and was renamed
OECD in 1961 following memberships of United States and Canada).
74. See id. (noting that OECD acts as facilitator and liaison for developing global
economy); see also Barbara Crutchfield George et al., The 1998 OECD Convention: An
Impetus for Worldwide Changes in Attitudes Toward Corruption in Business Transactions, 37
Am. Bus. L.J. 485, 487-88 (2000) (acknowledging OECD member nations' intention to
collectively assist developing nations' economic development and building global free
trade).
75. See OECD site, supra note 10 (noting OECD's change in operational focus to
include concerns of developing nations and interaction of policies of OECD member
nations with those of developing nations). The OECD endeavors to analyze how eco-
nomic and social policies will interact to perhaps facilitate growth via globalization or
stifle growth due to protectionism. Id..
76. See id. (stating that OECD seeks to create more prosperous and increasingly
knowledge-based world economy).
77. See Salzmann, supra note 15, at 773 (asserting that OECD has important role in
shaping non-economic policy on global basis).
78. See id. at 779-80 (stating that OECD enacts binding and non-binding interna-
tional legal instruments that are highly influential); see also Warren, supra note 54, at
133 (noting that non-binding OECD Model serves as influential template for interna-
tional tax treaties).
79. See Salzmann, supra note 15, at 777 (stating that OECD's research addresses
issues regarding the environment, agriculture, education, and employment).
80. See id. (stating that common among OECD activities in varied fields is focus on
economic impact).
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2. OECD's Role in International Taxation
International tax policy is among the issues addressed by
the OECD.8 For example, multilateral treaties, primarily based
on the OECD Model, alleviate double taxation problems.8 2 Fur-
thermore, the OECD analyzes, and consults on, a variety of addi-
tional global fiscal issues. 83
a. Entrance Into International Taxation
The OECD introduced its first OECD Model agreement for
multilateral tax treaties in draft form in 1963 and subsequently
updated and published it in 1977.84 The OECD Model facili-
tated the treaty process by standardizing treaty structure and
content, which contributed greatly to the proliferation of the tax
treaty network.8" The expanded treaty network facilitated global
economic agreements and promoted growth in international
trade.86
At first, the OECD Model did not receive unanimous accept-
ance. 87 For example, in 1977, the United States Treasury devel-
oped its own model agreement that reflected U.S. interests.8 8
Additionally, the United Nations ("U.N.") developed yet another
81. See OECD site, supra note 10 (asserting OECD's focus on international eco-
nomic issues, including taxation, to facilitate growth of global market place).
82. See Warren, supra note 54, at 133 (stating that OECD Model serves as founda-
tion for most treaty negotiations); see also Jones, supra note 56, at 2 (stating that most
modem tax treaties are based on OECD Model).
83. See OECD site, supra note 10 (listing various international fiscal issues, such as
transfer pricing, corruption, and statistical analysis, that OECD addresses).
84. See BAER, supra note 71, at 2 (noting that OECD initially released draft form of
OECD Model in 1963 and added further modifications to final version, released in
1977); see also OECD site, supra note 10 (noting that 1977 model agreement is founda-
tion for Model Tax Convention, which has subsequently been updated in 1992, 1994,
1995, 1997, and 2000).
85. See OGLEY, supra note 18, at 2, 36 (stating that most developed countries ap-
proved of uniform treaty structure, which eased and facilitated international agree-
ments).
86. See Barry J. Rodger, Competition Policy, Liberalism and Globalization: A European
Perspective, 6 COLUM.J. EuR. L. 289, 313-14 (2000) (stating that OECD cooperation rec-
ommendations in 1960's spawned current framework and initiatives for agreements im-
proving international trade).
87. See BASSINGER & GLAUTIER, supra note 19, at 160-61 (noting subsequent emer-
gence of alternate model treaties from U.N. and United States).
88. See BAKER, supra note 71, at 4 (stating that although it was later withdrawn in
1992, United States Treasury drafted its own model in 1977, later amended in 1981,
which targeted taxation of U.S. citizens); see also BASSINGER & GLAUTIER, supra note 19,
at 167 (stating that U.S. model agreement revolved around nationality principle, which
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model agreement in 1980.89 The OECD Model, however, gained
widespread acceptance and has become the dominant model for
treaty arrangements. 9°
b. OECD's Increasing Influence in International Taxation
In addition to addressing double taxation, the OECD ana-
lyzes a variety of other global taxation issues.91 Annually, the
OECD publishes statistics on tax revenues generated in OECD
member countries.9 2 OECD initiatives also include recommen-
dations on fighting corruption and implementing transfer-pric-
ing policies.93 Recently, the OECD shifted its focus to harmful
tax practices facilitated by globalization.94
D. Globalization and Increasing Tax Competition
Globalization is transforming international economic rela-
tions.95 The increased mobility of information and capital alters
the way business and finance transactions are conducted.96
taxed based on country of citizenship regardless of residence, thus conflicting with
OECD Model's residence principle).
89. See BASSINGER & GLAUTIER, supra note 19, at 160-61 (stating that unlike resi-
dence-based OECD Model, U.N. model emphasized principle of taxation at source of
generated income).
90. See KEES VAN RAXD, NONDISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL TAX LAw 3 (1986)
(noting that most existing tax treaties are based on OECD Model); see also Cockfield,
supra note 49, at 143 (stating that most important and influential treaty models include
OECD Model); Warren, supra note 54, at 133 (stating that OECD Model serves as gener-
ally accepted framework for treaty negotiations); Jones, supra note 56, at 2 (stating that
most modern tax treaties conform to OECD Model).
91. See OECD site, supra note 10 (noting various fiscal areas addressed by OECD).
92. Id.
93. See id. (explaining focus on corruption and transfer pricing). Transfer pricing
involves transactions between segments of a multinational entity, whereby one segment
pays for goods or services provided by another segment. Id. These transactions should
be commensurate with similar transactions between independent entities to ensure that
the multinational entity's tax base is fairly apportioned. Id.
94. See id. (stating that globalization proliferates spread of harmful tax competition
that requires cooperative redress).
95. See GLOBALIZATION OF SERVICES: SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND PRACTICE
I (Yair Aharoni & Lilach Nachum eds., 2000) [hereinafter GLOBALIZATION OF SERVICES]
(acknowledging vast shift in global economy resulting from globalization); see also Rod-
ger, supra note 86, at 289-90 (stating that globalization is marked by free markets and
increasing proliferation of global trade).
96. GLOBALIZATION OF SERVICES, supra note 95. See Terrill, supra note 20, at 218
(noting that globalization eases ability of businesses to seek and obtain cheaper meth-
ods of operation, partly through better tax rates, thus enhancing global economic effi-
ciency).
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Moreover, globalization has contributed to the proliferation of
the tax competition that the OECD seeks to curb.9 7
1. Globalization
While internationalization marked a fundamental change
for trade since the Middle Ages, post World War II globalization
is having a far greater impact on the world.98 Globalization em-
phasizes global perspectives while minimizing those of individual
nations; it stresses the interdependence of national interests. 99
Consequently, a substantial shift away from public interests to
private interests occurs.1 0° This shift results from a unified effort
between businesses and governments to globalize the world
economy.10
Globalization affects many areas of international law.' 0 2 For
example, cross-border mergers and acquisitions complicate the
traditional regulatory schemes of competition law. t03 Global en-
97. See 1998 REPORT, supra note 11 (asserting that globalization enables nations to
develop tax policies that induce investment from non-resident taxpayers).
98. See FiSCHER, supra note 28, at 3-4 (asserting that internationalization allowed
for individual nations to conduct global economic affairs in their independent national
capacities, while globalization is causing blending of such independent capacities); see
also Roin, supra note 12, at 544 (noting that although taxation of income from cross-
border transactions has historically been problematic, globalization is greatly exacerbat-
ing these problems through inability to track taxpayer's income generated abroad).
99. See FiSCHER, supra note 28, at 4 (noting that globalization results in diminished
independent national interests, causing national interdependence at expense of na-
tional independence); see also Rodger, supra note 86, at 312 (asserting that primary
contributors to globalization trend are private multinational enterprises).
100. See FISCHER, supra note 28, at 4 (noting resulting shift from national interests
to business related interests); see also Terrill, supra note 20, at 219 (acknowledging that
globalization is causing diminished governmental ownership and participation within
national economies).
101. See FISCHER, supra note 28 at 6 (asserting that initiatives to liberalize global
trade marketplace are made at behest of multinational businesses and result in collabo-
rations between businesses and national governments to facilitate globalized trade); see
also Utz, supra note 17, at 769 (stating national legislation that maintains and fosters
multinational enterprises perpetuates trend toward globalization).
102. See Edith Brown Weiss, The Rise or the Fall of International Law?, 69 FORDHAM L.
REv. 345, 348 (2000) (noting globalization's affect on establishment of international
regimes addressing issues in human rights, arms control, and environmental protec-
tion); see also Richard Falk & Andrew Strauss, On the Creation of a Global Peoples Assembly:
Legitimacy and the Power of Popular Sovereignty, 36 STAN. J. INT'L LAw 191, 212-13 (2000)
(stating that globalization affects traditionally domestic matters, such as bank loans to
underprivileged individuals, intellectual property, and food safety).
103. See Rodger, supra note 86, at 313 (stating that transnational mergers can cause
competition problems due to disagreements and uncertainty among multiple enforce-
ment authorities); see also Hachigian, supra note 9, at 117-18 (stating that commerce is
232 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 25:215
vironmental problems are spawning multi-national agreements
that serve as influential legal instruments." °4 Additionally, crimi-
nal and civil law are affected by an increasing international im-
pact on state jurisdictional authority. 105 International taxation is
similarly affected, as demonstrated by globalization's impact on
tax competition. 06
2. Increasing Tax Competition
Since World War II, the demand for financial services in de-
veloping jurisdictions has grown significantly. °7 High taxation
and increased regulation in developed nations encouraged indi-
viduals and corporations to seek more favorable locations to de-
posit their funds and transact business.'08 Recognizing the im-
pact this trend has upon their national economies, tax haven'0 9
increasingly occurring across many nations and domestic competition laws are requir-
ing more international focus).
104. See Weiss, supra note 102, at 351-52 (noting that global environmental issues
have proliferated multilateral agreements, initiated in part by OECD, U.N. Environ-
ment Programme, and U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization).
105. See Andrew L. Strauss, A Global Paradigm Shattered: The Jurisdictional Nihilism of
the Supreme Court's Abduction Decision in Alvarez-Machain, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 1209 (1994)
(stating that globalization provides new impetus to enhance international laws allocat-
ing state jurisdictional authority for enforcing domestic criminal and civil laws).
106. See OGLEY, supra note 18, at 15 (stating that globalization results in competi-
tive tax policies that governments adopt to raise revenue and attract investment); see also
Utz, supra note 17, at 770 (stating that globalization contributes to conditions that fos-
ter tax competition); Avi-Yonah, supra note 23, at 1575 (stating that globalization-ena-
bled mobility of capital results in international tax competition).
107. See ANTHONY SANFIELD GINSBERG, TAx HAVENS 3, 7 (1991) (illustrating
proliferation of tax haven jurisdictions offering financial services to foreign taxpayers).
108. See id. (noting that multinational corporations favor using tax havens as way to
conduct more efficient and profitable world trade); see also BASSINGER & GLAUTIER,
supra note 19, at 227-28 (stating that governments of high tax jurisdictions desire high
levels of social welfare and government spending, thus requiring businesses and high
net worth individuals to incur higher burden of social welfare costs through higher
taxes).
109. See GINSBERG, supra note 107, at 3 (stating that no precise definition for tax
haven exists, but three types ofjurisdictions have been classified as such: (1) those that
have no or very low taxes; (2) those where taxes are levied on internal events and no
taxes, or insignificant taxes, are levied on foreign source income; or (3) those that grant
special treatment to certain entities or operations); see alsoJ. Mukadi Ngoy, The Paradox
of Tax Havens: Consequences of the Subjective Approach, 12 J. INT'L TAx 34, 36-38 (2001)
(claiming that tax haven moniker has typically been applied to small or poor countries
whose tax policies have threatened interests of larger industrialized nations); cf BAS-
SINGER & GLAUTIER, supra note 19, at 228 (noting that industrialized nations can also be
characterized as tax havens due to significant benefits yielded by their respective tax
systems).
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governments have attempted to attract this capital by providing
favorable tax rates for non-resident monetary deposits.110 As a
result, these jurisdictions greatly depend on the income from fi-
nancial services and the products of more industrialized na-
tions.11 1
Globalization facilitates the trend towards financial tax
havens.1 12  The connection of regional markets through
networked computers and high-speed telecommunications in-
creases the mobility of capital and financial flows between na-
tions."13 Previously remote tax regimes are now readily accessi-
110. See GINSBERG, supra note 107, at 6 (stating that tax haven jurisdictions are not
economically advanced due to lack of natural resources, capital, and labor, which in
turn, contributes to insignificant agricultural or industrial economy); see also Robert W.
McGee, Principles Of Taxation For Emerging Economies: Lessons From The U.S. Experience, 12
DICK. J. INT'L L. 29, 49-50 (1993) (commenting that developing economies have diffi-
culty competing economically with developed economies and must adopt tax systems
that promote economic growth and development); BASSINGER & GLAUTIER, supra note
19, at 228 (stating that decision to become tax haven generally results from government
decisions to attract investment because lack of resources render these countries eco-
nomically underdeveloped); Laurey, supra note 52, at 483 (opining that developing na-
tions seek to attract foreign capital with tax benefits because their respective unedu-
cated workforce and poor infrastructure often fail to induce such foreign investment);
Weiss, supra note 16, at 108 (noting that some nations seek capital from taxpayers of
high-tax nations by providing tax-exempt opportunities, relaxed tax enforcement, and
eliminating tax withholding requirements for foreign investors); Charles I. Kingson,
The Coherence of International Taxation, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1151, 1161-62 (1981) (assert-
ing that developing nations must design tax incentives to attract foreign investment due
to lack of natural incentives, such as bountiful resources, compared with larger more
developed nations); Brown, supra note 12, at 321 (noting that lack of productive natural
resources of economically weak developed nations result in foreign aid and debt sup-
port from developing nations, thus hindering ability for internal economic develop-
ment, which constrains input on global economic affairs). Developed nations prefer to
assist developing nations by providing financial aid and debt. Id. This increases devel-
oping nations' dependence on developed nations and limits developing nations' input
on global economic affairs. Id.
111. See BASSINGER & GLAUTIER, supra note 19, at 228, 236 (stating that because of
their lack of natural resources, economies of developing countries depend more on
revenue from banking and finance than economies of developed countries, and devel-
oping nations also depend on manufactured products of developed nations); see also
OGLEY, supra note 18, at 8 (noting significant increase in financial sectors of tax haven
jurisdictions); Weiss, supra note 16, at 130 (acknowledging that greater capital mobility,
enabled by globalization, is reducing world's income gap by allowing developing na-
tions to grow economically at rate similar to wealthy, industrialized nations).
112. See GINSBERG, supra note 107, at 7 (stating that roughly fifty percent of inter-
national monetary transfers flow through tax havens).
113. See GLOBALIZATION OF SERVICES, supra note 95 (asserting that technological
advances have virtually eliminated barriers to moving capital abroad, thus inducing na-
tions to adopt favorable tax rates to attract such capital and investment); see also OGLEY,
supra note 18, at 89 (noting developments in telecommunications, characteristic of
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ble; communication improvements allow for the spreading and
sharing of tax planning techniques between regions. 11 4 The re-
sult is lost revenue for high tax jurisdictions.' 1 5
While an exact figure of lost revenue by industrialized na-
tions is nearly impossible to ascertain, a frequently cited study by
British poverty-fighting organization, Oxfam International,' 16
places the annual figure at US$50,000,000,000.' The OECD
places the amount of foreign direct investment flowing into Car-
ibbean and South Pacific countries, generally considered low tax
jurisdictions, at more than US$200,000,000,000 between 1985
and 1994, representing a rate of growth exceeding that of total
outbound foreign direct investment from industrialized na-
tions.118 Consequently, members of the OECD have sought to
contain the proliferation of favorable tax regimes.11 9
II. THE BULLY: OECD'S ASSAULT ON TAX COMPETITION
As a response to the concerns and requests of its member
nations, the OECD undertook an affirmative effort to address
the issue of tax competition.12 ° The OECD issued its 1998 Re-
globalization, result in increased financial flows that lead to significant tax competi-
tion); Weiss, supra note 16, at 99 (asserting explosive impact of technological innova-
tions on growing issue of international tax competition, such as increased mobility of
capital).
114. See OGLEY, supra note 18, at 11 (stating that simultaneous improvements in
transportation and communication encouraged establishment and utilization of tax
havens).
115. See id. (noting national tax authorities seeking to protect tax bases, or group
of taxpayers subject to taxing jurisdiction of particular nation); see also 1998 REPORT,
supra note 11, at 7 (asserting that tax competition facilitates erosion of tax revenue in
industrialized nations).
116. See Oxfam International, What is Oxfam International?, at http://www.oxfam.
org (defining Oxfam International as group of non-governmental organizations seek-
ing to analyze and combat global poverty and injustice).
117. See Arthur J. Cockfield, Transforming the Internet Into a Taxable Forum: A Case
Study in E-Commerce Taxation, 85 MINN. L. REv. 1171, 1234 (2001) (noting that Oxfam
International Study estimates cost of tax competition to developed nations at
US$50,000,000,000).
118. See 1998 REPORT, supra note 11, at 17 (stating that rate of direct investment
into Caribbean and South Pacific countries well exceeds growth rate of overall out-
bound foreign direct investment from seven most industrialized nations ("G7 na-
tions")).
119. See id. at 67-71 (suggesting adoption of proposed defensive measures to curb
tax competition).
120. See id. at 3 (stating that OECD seeks to develop measures to counter distorting
effects of harmful tax competition); see also Edmund W. Granski Jr., International Wealth
Management Initiatives, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 2, 2001, at 9 (stating that OECD seeks to develop
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port, discussing the impact of globalization, identifying jurisdic-
tions engaging in harmful tax competition, and establishing a
preliminary framework to counteract the resulting effects of
these jurisdictions. 121 Subsequently, the OECD issued its 2000
Report, which updated the work being done with jurisdictions
seeking to cooperate with the OECD and published defensive
measures that member countries could adopt to counteract un-
cooperative jurisdictions. 122
A. Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue-
The 1998 Report
In 1998, the OECD published the results of its study, which
identifies the causes and effects of harmful tax competition. 123
The 1998 Report identifies jurisdictions engaging in harmful tax
competition in both OECD member countries and non-member
countries. 124  Furthermore, it proposes various defensive mea-
sures to aid affected countries in curbing the effects of tax com-
petition. 125
measures to counter effects that harmful tax competition has on national tax bases of its
member countries).
121. See 1998 REPORT, supra note 11, at 3, 73-78 (outlining background of OECD
effort). In 1996, the OECD commissioned its Committee on Fiscal Affairs ("Commit-
tee") to analyze potential solutions and derive a global cooperative framework to
counteract tax competition. Id. at 3. In January of 1998, the Committee-created Spe-
cial Sessions on Tax Competition presented their findings in the 1998 Report. Id. The
OECD ministers subsequently endorsed the 1998 Report in April of 1998. Id. Luxem-
bourg and Switzerland abstained during the approval process. Id. at 73-78. Luxem-
bourg abstained on the grounds that bank secrecy and information exchange provi-
sions should not be factors in identifying harmful regimes and that the OECD's effort
lacked effective consultations with non-member countries. Id. Switzerland abstained
because of the 1998 Report's failure to factor in non-tax aspects constituting harmful
tax competition and the 1998 Report's subjective comparisons on tax rates, thus in-
fringing on territorial sovereignty. Id.
122. 2000 REPORT, supra note 11.
123. See 1998 REPORT, supra note 11, at 14 (stating that globalization facilitates
harmful tax competition by allowing taxpayers to exploit developing tax policies by
diverting financial capital, which can induce potential distortion in trade and invest-
ment).
124. See id. at 8 (stating that both OECD member countries and non-member
countries are identified as harmful tax regimes); see also David E. Spencer, Stepping Up
The Pressure On Tax Havens: An Update, 12 J. INT'L TAX'N 26, 29 (2001) (stating that
1998 Report has great impact by addressing harmful tax practices in both OECD mem-
ber countries, non-member countries, and their dependencies).
125. See 1998 REPORT, supra note 11, at 67-71 (enumerating tactics that could be
adopted as part of unified effort to curb tax competition); see also David E. Spencer,
OECD Report Cracks Down On Harmful Tax Competition, 9 J. INT'L TAx'N 26, 32 (1998)
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1. Background of the 1998 Report
The OECD initiated its study to determine the extent of
global tax competition. 126 Focusing on geographically mobile
activities, 121 the Committee on Fiscal Affairs ("Committee") ex-
amined provisions in various tax systems across the world. 126
The Committee aimed to determine which tax systems had char-
acteristics intended mainly to divert capital from higher tax juris-
dictions. 12
9
The study specifically notes the beneficial effects of global-
ization, such as facilitating tax system reform that focuses on
base-broadening and rate reductions. 13 ° Moreover, globalization
encourages reassessment of domestic tax systems to reduce gov-
ernmental spending and induce investment. 3 Additionally, ex-
pansion of financial markets facilitate capital flows for increased
global welfare.' 32
The 1998 Report also emphasizes the negative impact of
globalization and its impact on tax competition, including the
increased ability to move mobile capital into lower tax jurisdic-
tions.133 This raises the potential for political pressure in coun-
(noting that 1998 Report lists unilateral and bilateral defensive measures to address
harmful tax practices).
126. See 1998 REPORT, supra note 11, at 8 (stating that harmful tax competition
dislocates financial and service activities, erodes national tax bases of other countries,
distorts trade and investment patterns, and diminishes fairness and social acceptance of
tax systems); see also Granski, supra note 120, at 9 (asserting that 1998 Report intended
to develop understanding of how tax competitive jurisdictions affect location of finan-
cial and service activities).
127. See 1998 REPORT, supra note 11, at 8 (stating that 1998 Report focuses on
financial and service activities).
128. See id. at 8 (stating that 1998 Report examines general income tax provisions
and specific taxes levied on certain types of income).
129. See id. at 14 (stating that such harmful tax systems induce distortions in trade
and investment patterns, which may adversely affect tax bases of other countries).
130. See id. at 13 (stating that globalization has been driving force behind tax re-
forms).
131. See id. (stating that globalization has improved fiscal climate for financial in-
vestment).
132. See id. at 14 (stating that cross-border capital flows have improved global wel-
fare and standards of living due to more efficient allocation and utilization of re-
sources).
133. See id. at 16 (identifying effects of capital dislocation). The 1998 Report lists
the harms caused from this capital movement as follows:
1. distorting financial and, indirectly, real investment flows;
2. undermining the integrity and fairness of tax structures;
3. discouraging compliance by all taxpayers;
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tries to lower their tax rates to attract investments, which could
result in the erosion of tax bases of other countries. 1 4 The 1998
Report states that this distortion of capital flows will hinder the
expansion of global economic growth.135
The 1998 Report, however, does not distinguish between
beneficial and harmful jurisdictions.136 Instead, the OECD
merely suggests that the criteria be analyzed in the context of
whether a nation shifts investment activity to its jurisdiction
solely to exploit tax benefits.1 3 ' Additionally, the presence and
level of activities in the host country must be commensurate with
the amount of investment or income generated by such activi-
ties. 138 Furthermore, an assessment should be made as to
whether tax benefits are the primary motivation for the location
of an activity.13
9
The OECD seeks to promote and maintain the economic
growth brought about by cross-border trade and investment. 4 °
Consequently, the OECD asserts that the distortion of capital
4. re-shaping the desired level and mix of taxes and public spending;
5. causing undesired shifts of part of the tax burden to less mobile tax bases,
such as labor, property and consumption; and
6. increasing the administrative costs and compliance burdens on tax author-
ities and taxpayers.
Id.; see also Spencer, supra note 124, at 29 (noting 1998 Report's emphasis on globaliza-
tion and technology contributing to tax competition).
134. See 1998 REPORT, supra note 11, at 14 (asserting that eroding tax base would
constrain country outlays for national defense, education, and other public services); see
also Spencer, supra note 125, at 31 (noting 1998 Report's assertion that governments
are encouraged to divert financial and service activities to their respective countries).
135. See 1998 REPORT, supra note 11, at 8-9 (asserting that competition for eco-
nomic activities, where tax is not influential, is essential for optimal global economic
growth); see also Spencer, supra note 125, at 31 (noting that 1998 Report asserts that
distortion of trade and investment patterns reduce global welfare).
136. See 1998 REPORT, supra note 11, at 8 (acknowledging that no distinction be-
tween beneficial and harmful jurisdictions was attempted); see also Melo, supra note 16,
at 198 (acknowledging OECD's failure to discern between beneficial tax competition
and harmful tax competition).
137. See 1998 REPORT, supra note 11, at 34-35 (stating that investment does not
contribute to any business activity specific to jurisdiction).
138. See id. at 35 (stating that disproportionate amount of investment raises pre-
sumption of harmful preferential tax regime).
139. See id. at 35 (stating that tax systems induced investments).
140. See id. at 8-9 (commenting that cross-border trade and investment is main
engine behind global economic growth); see also Spencer, supra note 124, at 29 (noting
OECD's intention to promote global economic growth through increased cross-border
trade and investment and decreased tax influenced distortion of capital flows and ser-
vice activities).
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flow induced by tax competition must be addressed, as it is be-
coming an increasing problem. 4' The OECD opines that an in-
ternational cooperative effort is required because of the inher-
ently global nature of tax competition.'
14 2
2. Tax Competition
The 1998 Report asserts that detrimental tax practices can
take the form of tax havens or harmful preferential tax re-
gimes.143 Although some criteria for identifying both are simi-
lar, specific provisions vary enough to allow a jurisdiction to be
classified as either a tax haven or one that has a harmful prefer-
ential tax regime.144 The two are distinguished throughout the
1998 Report. 45
a. Tax Havens
Generally, tax havens are jurisdictions with nominal tax
rates, or no tax rates, that fail to generate significant revenue. 146
The 1998 Report enumerates specific criteria for identifying tax
havens: the jurisdiction imposes no or only nominal taxes; the
jurisdiction lacks policy of effective exchange of information;147
the jurisdiction lacks transparency; 148 and the jurisdiction has no
141. See 1998 REPORT, supra note 11, at 9 (stating that Committee believes harmful
tax competition is already posing problems for governments and will increase in impor-
tance).
142. See id. at 10 (stating that global effort will yield more effective results).
143. See id. at 8 (noting common significant difference between tax havens and
harmful preferential tax regimes is amount of revenue generated by tax system); see also
Spencer, supra note 124, at 28 (claiming that OECD seeks to reform tax systems in both
harmful preferential tax regimes and tax havens).
144. See 1998 REPORT, supra note 11, at 22-34 (noting that harmful preferential tax
regimes can have provisions in tax legislation that give preferential treatment to specific
class of taxpayers, while tax havens primarily offer no, or very low, taxes to all types of
income).
145. See id. at 20-21 (stating that 1998 Report maintains distinction because of rele-
vance to application of counter-measures against these jurisdictions); see also Spencer,
supra note 125, at 31 (noting that 1998 Report distinguishes between tax haven jurisdic-
tion and harmful preferential tax regimes).
146. See 1998 REPORT, supra note 11, at 21 (stating that tax havens do not generate
significant revenue from tax systems and also have reduced regulatory and administra-
tive constraints).
147. See id. at 22-23 (noting that tax havens typically have legislative or administra-
tive policies that create strict bank secrecy rules).
148. See id. (stating that other jurisdictions would not readily be able to ascertain
operation of legislative, legal, or administrative provisions of tax haven jurisdiction).
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requirement of "substantial activities." '149
OECD nations subjectively analyzed these factors in deter-
mining whether a jurisdiction offers itself as a place to be used
by non-residents to evade their domestic tax authorities.15 ° Es-
sentially, these jurisdictions allow non-resident taxpayers to hold
passive investments, book paper profits, and hide their affairs
from discovery by their resident-country taxing authorities."'
The 1998 Report, however, does not state what tax rate would be
considered nominal and characteristic of a tax haven.1 52
b. Harmful Preferential Tax Regimes
Harmful preferential tax regimes occur in non-haven coun-
tries that derive significant revenue from their respective tax pol-
icies, but whose tax systems have features sufficient to classify
them as engaging in harmful tax competition.15 The four main
factors in identifying a harmful preferential tax regime are: no
or low effective tax rates;15 4 ring-fencing;155 lack of trans-
parency;15 6 and lack of effective exchange of information.157
The 1998 Report lists additional criteria to be analyzed upon
149. See id. (stating that activity fails to add value to tax haven jurisdiction and is
purely tax driven).
150. See id. (stating that tax havens offer investors incentives to attract financial
and service activities that allow non-resident taxpayers to escape resident-country tax
authorities); see also Spencer, supra note 125, at 32 (noting that 1998 Report focused on
jurisdictions whose tax systems intend to provide method for non-residents to escape
taxation in their resident country).
151. See 1998 REPORT, supra note 11, at 22 (stating that tax havens induce purely
tax driven activities).
152. Id. at 22-25. The 1998 Report does not enumerate the tax rate or range of tax
rates indicative of tax havens. Id.; see also Spencer, supra note 125, at 32 (noting that
1998 Report does not propose tax rate to identify tax havens); Melo, supra note 16, at
197 (commenting on failure of OECD to propose tax rate considered harmful).
153. See 1998 REPORT, supra note 11, at 20-21 (stating that harmful preferential tax
regimes typically have tax rates that generate revenue, the level of which is significantly
lower than revenue generated by another country's tax regime).
154. See id. at 26 (stating that tax rate may be low or zero because either it is very
low itself in comparison with other nations, most notably nations of OECD, or because
of country's determination of applicable tax base for that rate, essentially isolating dif-
ferent types of income and subjecting it to favorable tax rates).
155. See id. (stating that ring-fencing results when low rates are fully or partially
insulated from domestic economy and applicable only to non-residents).
156. See id. at 28 (stating that such regimes fail to clearly identify administrative
practices against taxpayer and fails to make details of regime available to tax authorities
of other countries).
157. See id. at 29-30 (stating that regime could be restrained from exchange of
information due to statutory secrecy laws or administrative policies or practices).
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confirmation of the four previous criteria, 15 8 but fails to propose
a specific tax rate that would be considered part of a harmful
preferential tax regime. 15 9
3. OECD's Response to Tax Competition
Asserting that governments need to proactively counter the
impact and spread of tax havens and harmful preferential tax
regimes, the 1998 Report lists 19 recommendations ("Recom-
mendations"), which countries may adopt to counteract the neg-
ative impacts of the tax systems of these jurisdictions. 60 The
158. See id. at 30-34 (listing additional criteria for identifying harmful preferential
tax regimes). The following are among the additional analytical factors:
1. An artificial definition of the tax base;
2. Failure to adhere to international transfer-pricing principles;
3. Foreign source income exempt from tax;
4. Negotiable tax rate or tax base;
5. Existence of secrecy provisions;
6. Access to a wide network of tax treaties;
7. Regime which are promoted as tax minimisation vehicles; and
8. The regime encourages purely tax driven operations or arrangements.
Id.
159. See id. at 25-35 (failing to suggest appropriate tax rate as benchmark to iden-
tify harmful tax practices). Similar to the lack of a tax rate for identifying tax havens,
the 1998 Report fails to enumerate a tax range indicative of harmful preferential tax
regimes. Id.; see also Spencer, supra note 125, at 32 (noting 1998 Report's failure to
identify tax range characteristic of harmful preferential tax regimes).
160. See 1998 REPORT, supra note 11, at 37, 67-71 (reasoning that Recommenda-
tions are necessary because governments of developed nations cannot afford continued
erosion of their tax bases). The 19 Recommendations are:
I. Recommendations concerning domestic legislation and practices
1. Recommendation concerning Controlled Foreign Corporations
(CFC) or equivalent rules: that countries that do not have such rules
consider adopting them and that countries that have such rules en-
sure that they apply in a fashion consistent with the desirability of
curbing harmful tax practices.
2. Recommendation concerning foreign investment fund or equivalent
rules: that countries that do not have such rules consider adopting
them and that countries that have such rules consider applying them
to income and entities covered by practices considered to constitute
harmful tax competition.
3. Recommendation concerning restrictions on participation exemp-
tion and other systems of exempting foreign income in the context of
harmful tax competition: that countries that apply the exemption
method to eliminate double taxation of foreign source income con-
sider adopting rules that would ensure that foreign income that has
benefited from tax practices deemed as constituting harmful tax
competition do not qualify for the application of the exemption
method.
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4. Recommendation concerning foreign information reporting rules:
that countries that do not have rules concerning reporting of interna-
tional transactions and foreign operations of resident taxpayers con-
sider adopting such rules and that countries exchange information
obtained under these rules.
5. Recommendation concerning rulings: that countries, where adminis-
trative decisions concerning the particular position of a taxpayer may
be obtained in advance of planned transactions, make public the con-
ditions for granting, denying or revoking such decisions.
6. Recommendation concerning transfer pricing rules: that countries
follow principles set out in the OECD's 1995 Guidelines on Transfer
Pricing and thereby refrain from applying or not applying their trans-
fer pricing rules in a way that would constitute harmful tax competi-
tion.
7. Recommendation concerning access to banking information for tax
purposes: in the context of counteracting harmful tax competition,
countries should review their laws, regulations and practices which
govern access to banking information with a view to removing imped-
iments to the access to such information by tax authorities.
II. Recommendations concerning tax treaties
8. Recommendation concerning greater and more efficient use of ex-
changes of information: that countries should undertake programs
to intensify exchange of relevant information concerning transactions
in tax havens and preferential tax regimes constituting harmful tax
competition.
9. Recommendation concerning the entitlement to treaty benefits: that
countries consider including in their tax conventions provisions
aimed at restricting the entitlement to treaty benefits for entities and
income covered by measures constituting harmful tax practices and
consider how the existing provisions of their tax conventions can be
applied for the same purpose; that the Model Tax Convention be
modified to include such provisions or clarifications as are needed in
that respect.
10. Recommendation concerning the clarification of the status of domes-
tic anti-abuse rules and doctrines in tax treaties: that the Commen-
tary on the Model Tax Convention be clarified to remove any uncer-
tainty or ambiguity regarding the compatibility of domestic anti-abuse
measures with the Model Tax Convention.
11. Recommendation concerning a list of specific exclusion provisions
found in treaties: that the Committee prepare and maintain a list of
provisions used by countries to exclude from the benefits of tax con-
ventions certain specific entities or types of income and that the list
be used by Member countries as a reference point when negotiating
tax conventions and as a basis for discussions in the Forum.
12. Recommendation concerning tax treaties with tax havens: that coun-
tries consider terminating their tax conventions with tax havens and
consider not entering into tax treaties with such countries in the fu-
ture.
13. Recommendation concerning co-ordinated enforcement regimes
(joint audits; co-ordinated training programmes, etc.): that countries
consider undertaking co-ordinated enforcement programs (such as
simultaneous examinations, specific exchange of information
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projects or joint training activities) in relation to income or taxpayers
benefiting from practices constituting harmful tax competition.
14. Recommendation concerning assistance in recovery of tax claims:
that countries be encouraged to review the current rules applying to
the enforcement of tax claims of other countries and that the Com-
mittee pursue its work in this area with a view to drafting provisions
that could be included in tax conventions for that purpose.
III. Recommendations to intensify international co-operation in response to
harmful tax competition
15. Recommendation for Guidelines and a Forum on Harmful Tax Prac-
tices: that the Member countries endorse the Guidelines on harmful
preferential tax regimes set out [below] and establish a Forum to im-
plement the Guidelines and other Recommendations in this Report.
Recommendation 15 Guidelines For Dealing With Harmful
Preferential Tax Regimes in Member Countries
i. To refrain from adopting new measures, or extending the scope of,
or strengthening existing measures, in the form of legislative provi-
sions or administrative practices related to taxation, that constitute
harmful tax practices as defined in Section III of Chapter 2 of the
[1998] Report.
ii. To review their existing measures for the purpose of identifying
those measures, in the form of legislative provisions or administra-
tive practices related to taxation, that constitute harmful tax prac-
tices as defined in Section III of Chapter 2 of the [1998] Report.
These measures will be reported to the Forum on Harmful Tax
Practices and will be included in a list within 2 years from the date
on which these Guidelines are approved by the OECD Council.
iii. To remove, before the end of 5 years from the date on which the
Guidelines are approved by the OECD Council, the harmful fea-
tures of their preferential tax regimes identified in the list referred
to in paragraph 2. However, in respect of taxpayers who are bene-
fiting from such regimes on 31 December 2000, the benefits that
they derive will be removed at the latest on the 31 December 2005.
This will ensure that such particular tax benefits have been entirely
removed after that date. The list referred to in paragraph 2 will be
reviewed annually to delete those regimes that no longer constitute
harmful preferential tax regimes.
iv. Each member country which believes that an existing measure not
already included in the list referred to in paragraph 2, or a pro-
posed or new measure of itself or of another country, constitutes a
measure, in the form of legislative provision or administrative prac-
tice related to taxation, that might constitute a harmful tax practice
in light of the factors identified in Section III of Chapter 2 of the
[1998] Report, may request that the measure be examined by the
Member countries, through the Forum on Harmful Tax Practices,
for purposes of the application of paragraph 1 or for inclusion in
the list referred to in paragraph 2. The Forum may issue a non-
binding opinion on that question.
v. To co-ordinate, through the Forum, their national and treaty re-
sponses to harmful tax practices adopted by other countries.
vi. To use the Forum to encourage actively non-member countries to
associate themselves with these Guidelines.
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Recommendations focus on encouraging and providing gui-
dance to harmful tax jurisdictions to enact or reform their tax
legislation and practices.16' Additionally, the Recommendations
encourage harmful jurisdictions to alter treaty arrangements
with OECD member nations. 6 2  OECD countries are en-
couraged to terminate existing treaties with tax havens, or those
countries that have dependencies that are tax havens, and not to
enter into treaties with such countries until the harmful tax fea-
tures are removed.'
63
The 1998 Report also established a Forum1 64 to implement
the Recommendations and consult jurisdictions with harmful
preferential tax regimes seeking to reform their respective tax
systems. 165 The Committee mandated the Forum to establish a
16. Recommendation to produce a list of tax havens: that the Forum be
mandated to establish, within one year of the first meeting of the Fo-
rum, a list of tax havens on the basis of the factors identified in sec-
tion II of Chapter 2.
17. Recommendation concerning links with tax havens: that countries
that have political, economic or other links with tax havens ensure
that these links do not contribute to harmful tax competition and, in
particular, that countries that have dependencies that are tax havens
ensure that the links that they have with these tax havens are not used
in a way that increase or promote harmful tax competition.
18. Recommendation to develop and actively promote Principles of
Good Tax Administration: that the Committee be responsible for de-
veloping and actively promoting a set of principles that should guide
tax administrations in the enforcement of the Recommendations in-
cluded in this report.
19. Recommendation on associating non-member countries with the Rec-
ommendation: that the new Forum engage in a dialogue with non-
member countries using, where appropriate, the fora offered by
other international tax organizations, with the aim of promoting the
Recommendations set out in this Chapter, including the Guidelines.
Id.
161. See id. at 39 (stating that Recommendations are divided into three categories:
those concerning domestic legislation; those concerning tax treaties; and those facilitat-
ing international cooperation); see also Spencer, supra note 125, at 32 (stating that some
Recommendations address domestic fiscal legislation and practice).
162. See 1998 REPORT, supra note 11, at 39, 46 (stating that certain Recommenda-
tions ensure that tax treaties do not promote effects of harmful tax competition); see
also Spencer, supra note 125, at 32 (stating that some Recommendations address bilat-
eral tax treaties).
163. See 1998 REPORT, supra note 11, at 50 (stating that although treaty reform is to
be decided by each affected country, cooperative efforts can increase credibility of such
action).
164. See id. at 54 (stating that Forum is subsidiary body of Committee, created
solely to focus on remedial work against harmful tax competition).
165. See id. (stating that Forum is responsible for overseeing implementation of
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list of tax havens and countries with harmful preferential tax re-
gimes.' 6 6 Additionally, the Committee instructed the Forum to
engage in a dialogue with cooperative non-member countries to
promote the 1998 Report's Recommendations. 167 The Recom-
mendations set forth a deadline when identified harmful fea-
tures of these regimes are to be eliminated. 168
B. Towards Global Tax Co-operation: Progress in Identifying and
Eliminating Harmful Tax Practices-The 2000 Report
In June 2000, the Forum presented the OECD Ministers
with a progress report ("2000 Report") on the implementation
of the Recommendations. 169 Particularly, the 2000 Report iden-
tifies OECD member countries with harmful preferential tax re-
gimes, provides an update on consultations conducted with non-
member countries, and specifies proposals for further work.'70
Additionally, the 2000 Report identifies jurisdictions that met
the criteria for being tax havens. 7' The 2000 Report enumer-
ates various defensive measures that OECD member countries
1998 Report's Recommendations and engaging in dialogue with non-member coun-
tries).
166. See id. at 54-55 (noting that Forum is responsible for identifying harmful pref-
erential tax regimes and tax havens by utilizing criteria from 1998 Report); see also
Granski, supra note 120 (stating that Forum is established to implement guidelines of
1998 Report); see also Spencer, supra note 124, at 30 (noting Forum's responsibility to
conduct ongoing evaluation of preferential tax regimes, analyze effectiveness of Recom-
mendations and identify tax havens).
167. See 1998 REPORT, supra note 11, at 54-55 (noting that Forum is avenue for
discussion on harmful preferential tax regimes, which will assist harmful tax competi-
tive jurisdictions to meet Recommendations of 1998 Report).
168. See id. (noting proposed deadlines for jurisdictional compliance). The 1998
Report suggested that harmful preferential tax regimes remove their respective harmful
features by April 2003. Id. A special "grandfather provision" allows for regimes with
features benefiting taxpayers on December 31, 2000 to have these features removed by
December 31, 2005. Id. Additionally, a "standstill provision" precludes a country from
adopting new features or broadening existing features. Id.
169. See 2000 REPORT, supra note 11, at 6 (stating that some OECD member coun-
tries are working to reform harmful tax practices and tax havens may commit to follow
1998 Report Recommendations); see also Spencer, supra note 124, at 30 (noting 2000
Report's summary of Forum's work in identifying harmful preferential regimes in
OECD member countries, identifying tax havens, and summarizing consultations with
non-member countries).
170. See 2000 REPORT, supra note 11, at 12 (stating that comprehensive list also
contains OECD regimes that may not be harmful).
171. See id. at 16-17 (stating that list merely reflects results of study, not intended to
provoke retaliation).
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could adopt against uncooperative jurisdictions. 17 2
1. Preferential Regimes
The 2000 Report identifies the process by which the individ-
ual tax policies of OECD member countries were analyzed. 7 '
This process identifies OECD member countries with harmful
172. Id. at 25. The proposed defensive measures are:
a) To disallow deductions, exemptions, credits, or other allowances related
to transactions with Uncooperative Tax Havens or to transactions taking
advantage of their harmful tax practices.
b) To require comprehensive information reporting rules for transactions
involving Uncooperative Tax Havens or taking advantage of their harmful
tax practices, supported by substantial penalties for inaccurate reporting
or non-reporting of such transactions.
c) For countries that do not have Controlled Foreign Corporation or
equivalent (CFC) rules, to consider adopting such rules, and for countries
that have such rules, to ensure that they apply in a fashion consistent with
the desirability of curbing harmful tax practices (Recommendation 1 of
the 1998 Report).
d) To deny any exceptions (e.g. reasonable cause) that may otherwise apply
to the application of regular penalties in the case of transactions involving
entities organised in Uncooperative Tax Havens or taking advantage of
their harmful tax practices.
e) To deny the availability of the foreign tax credit or the participation ex-
emption with regard to distributions that are sourced from Uncooperative
Tax Havens or to transactions taking advantage of their harmful tax prac-
tices.
f) To impose withholding taxes on certain payments to residents of Uncoop-
erative Tax Havens.
g) To enhance audit and enforcement activities with respect to Uncoopera-
tive Tax Havens and transactions taking advantage of their harmful tax
practices.
h) To ensure that any existing and new domestic defensive measures against
harmful tax practices are also applicable to transaction with Uncoopera-
tive Tax Havens and to transactions taking advantage of their harmful tax
practices.
i) Not to enter into any comprehensive income tax conventions with Unco-
operative Tax Havens, and to consider terminating any such existing con-
ventions unless certain conditions are met (Recommendation 12 of the
1998 Report).
j) To deny deductions and cost recovery, to the extent otherwise allowable,
for fees and expenses incurred in establishing or acquiring entities incor-
porated in Uncooperative Tax Havens.
k) To impose 'transactional' charges or levies on certain transactions involv-
ing Uncooperative Tax Havens.
Id.
173. See id. at 10-16 (outlining review process of tax systems and policies of OECD
member countries).
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preferential tax schemes.1 74 Furthermore, the 2000 Report pro-
vides an update on consultations conducted with non-member
countries and specifies the plan for further work with these
countries.1
75
a. OECD Member Countries
The Forum requested that each member country perform a
self-review of its tax systems in relation to the harmful preferen-
tial tax regime criteria. 176 Simultaneously, the Forum conducted
abstract 177 cross-country reviews, followed by a peer review pro-
cess that consisted of extensive questionnaires requiring re-
sponses to specific regime questions and more general questions
about the harmful tax regime criteria. 7  The Forum evaluated
the responses and data from these review processes.1
79
The 2000 Report identifies forty-seven potentially harmful
preferential tax regimes in member countries.' 80 These regimes
are identified as potentially harmful, however, even though an
accurate assessment of the regime's harmful effects have not
been determined.' 1 As a result, the list of regimes includes ju-
risdictions whose tax systems may not actually be harmful under
their particular circumstances.18 2
The Forum intends to develop guidelines, known as applica-
tion notes, 1 3 on applying the harmful tax regime criteria in an
174. See id. at 12-14 (identifying nations and regimes as potentially harmful).
175. See id. at 22-23 (asserting that non-member nations will have to play important
role in implementation of OECD initiatives).
176. See id. at 9-10 (requesting all OECD member nations to analyze their tax sys-
tems to identify existence of harmful tax policies or practices).
177. See id. (stating that reviews were intended to be objective without prior knowl-
edge of specific nation being assessed).
178. See id. (noting that OECD member countries answered questionnaires in writ-
ing and results were discussed at Forum meetings).
179. See id. at 10 (noting that review process lasted from November 1999 through
May 2000).
180. See id. at 12-14, 22-23 (identifying specific harmful nations and regimes). The
OECD member countries with harmful preferential tax regimes are: Australia,
Belgium, Canada, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Korea,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and
United States. Id.
181. See id. at 12 (stating that further work will allow OECD member countries to
determine harmful extent, if any, of certain regimes).
182. See id. (stating that harm of certain regimes depends upon application in spe-
cific circumstances).
183. See id. at 15 (stating that application notes will illustrate problematic features
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objective manner, equally applicable to any potentially harmful
regime.18 4 These application notes will assist member countries
in determining whether their tax systems are, or could be, harm-
ful and the procedure for removing the harmful features of such
regimes.'8 5 Such assistance is intended to allow harmful jurisdic-
tions to meet the deadlines for compliance, which will be veri-
fied by the Forum.18 6
b. Non-Member Countries
The Committee states that non-member countries must
have a key role in the efforts against harmful tax competition.18 v
Citing the global nature of harmful tax competition, the Com-
mittee seeks to include non-member jurisdictions by encourag-
ing non-members to familiarize themselves with the 1998 Report
and to adopt its features.' Additionally, the Committee plans
to hold regional seminars to assist with and facilitate the removal
of harmful features in the tax systems of non-member jurisdic-
tions. 1 8 9
2. Review of Tax Havens
The 2000 Report identifies thirty-five jurisdictions as tax
havens, because they meet the criteria described in the 1998 Re-
port.' 90 The OECD requests that such jurisdictions make adjust-
of various tax regimes based upon criteria outlined in 1998 Report and cross-country
reviews).
184. See id. (stating that application notes would be provided without reference to
specific regimes).
185. See id. at 15-16 (asserting that tax systems will be analyzed with respect to
application notes to determine degree of harm of tax policies).
186. See 1998 REPORT, supra note 11, at 54-55 (noting deadlines for compliance by
harmful jurisdictions); see also Spencer, supra note 124, at 34 (noting 2000 Report's
schedule and review process to monitor compliance by advance commitment and
scheduled commitment jurisdictions).
187. See 2000 REPORT, supra note 11, at 22 (stating that non-member countries
need to be included in effort because they are either affected by or have harmful tax
practices); see also Spencer, supra note 125, at 29 (noting OECD's recognition that tax
competition is inherently global issue requiring input and cooperation of non-member
countries).
188. See 2000 REPORT, supra note 11, at 22 (stating that working with non-member
economies would facilitate removal of harmful tax practices).
189. See id. (noting that seminars will allow OECD to better understand concerns
of non-member countries).
190. See id. at 17 (listing tax havens). The jurisdictions identified as tax havens are:
Andorra, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize,
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ments to their respective fiscal policies to conform with the Rec-
ommendations of the 1998 Report.1 91 Any tax haven jurisdiction
that fails to comply will be deemed uncooperative and may be
subject to defensive measures by the OECD member coun-
tries. 1
a. Identification of Tax Havens
During the evaluation process, the Forum requested that
these jurisdictions submit relevant information about their spe-
cific tax systems. 193 The Forum analyzed this information and,
based on this analysis, produced jurisdiction reports.19" In many
cases, jurisdictions with harmful practices provided input and
agreed to the provisions of the jurisdiction reports. 195 Based on
these procedures, the Forum made technical evaluations 196 of
the jurisdictions meeting the tax haven criteria and these evalua-
tions are the basis for the preliminary list of identified tax
havens. 197
The preliminary list excluded a number of jurisdictions,
however, if they made an advance commitment 98 to eliminate
British Virgin Islands, Cook Islands, Commonwealth of Dominica, Gibraltar, Grenada,
Guernsey/Sark/Alderney, Isle of Man, Jersey, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Maldives, Mar-
shall Islands, Monaco, Montserrat, Nauru, Netherlands Antilles, Niue, Panama, Samoa,
Seychelles, St. Lucia, St. Christopher & Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Tonga,
Turks & Caicos, U.S. Virgin Islands, and Vanuatu. Id.
191. See 1998 REPORT, supra note 11, at 67-71 (requesting that tax havens adopt
CFC rules, foreign investment fund rules, and exchange of information policies among
other things).
192. See 2000 REPORT, supra note 11, at 18-19 (asserting that tax havens failing to
comply with OECD effort will be included in list of uncooperative tax havens and po-
tentially subjected to defensive measures).
193. See id. at 10 (stating that information would enable application of tax haven
criteria to jurisdiction's specific situations).
194. See id. (noting jurisdiction reports act as summary of information provided to
and analyzed by OECD working groups).
195. See id. (stating that input and participation of all jurisdictions was en-
couraged).
196. See id. at 11 (stating that technical evaluations solely identified jurisdictions
containing tax haven criteria, notwithstanding evidence that some jurisdictions meet
higher standards of transparency, openness, and exchange of information, and that
such jurisdictions possess superior internal financial regulation).
197. See id. at 16-17 (enumerating identified tax havens).
198. See id. at 16 (characterizing advance commitment jurisdictions). Advance
commitments are high-level political commitments from tax haven jurisdictions acqui-
escing to requests of OECD, including a standstill, whereby jurisdictions agree not to
introduce new harmful tax practices and not to continue existing harmful tax practices.
Id. Such jurisdictions, in conjunction with the Forum, will formulate a compliance
2001] THE GLOBAL SCHOOLYARD BULLY 249
the harmful features of their tax systems and comply with the
Recommendations of the 1998 Report.199 In furthering a coop-
erative effort between the OECD and the listed jurisdictions, the
Forum will continue to solicit commitments from these jurisdic-
tions.20 0 Alternatively, jurisdictions that failed to make advance
commitments can still demonstrate their interest in cooperating
with the OECD by making "scheduled commitments," agree-
ments occurring after the release of the preliminary list of identi-
fied tax havens.20 1
Acknowledging the efforts of advance commitment and
scheduled commitment tax havens, the Committee will continue
to consult with these cooperative jurisdictions to complete the
information process.20 2 The 2000 Report asserts that this work
will entail developing a multilateral agreement for exchange of
information, evaluating the transitive assistance 20 3 that jurisdic-
tions will require, and encouraging such jurisdictions to consult
with existing worldwide organizations to improve tax administra-
tion and enforcement.2 4 The Committee also intends to work
with other international organizations to address the potential
plan, illustrating procedures and timetables for reform. Id. Jurisdictions must com-
plete "concrete and significant action" within the first year of their respective commit-
ments. Id.
199. See Spencer, supra note 124, at 34 (noting 2000 Report's assertion of exclud-
ing jurisdictions that made public political commitments to eliminate harmful features
of their tax systems and comply with 1998 Report).
200. See 2000 REPORT, supra note 11, at 18 (stating that solicitations will continue
through July 2001).
201. See id. at 19 (characterizing scheduled commitment jurisdictions). Scheduled
commitments require jurisdictions, in conjunction with the Forum, to develop plans for
procedure and timetables for reformation. Id. This plan is required within six months
of the stated commitment. Id. Similar to advance commitmentjurisdictions, scheduled
commitment jurisdictions must agree to a standstill and must complete "concrete and
significant action" within the first year of commitment. Id.
202. See id. at 20-21 (noting OECD's intention to assist jurisdictions with compli-
ance and to further obtain additional information).
203. See id. (stating that jurisdictions complying with tax reform principles of 2000
Report may encounter reductions in certain financial and service activities that need to
be addressed).
204. See id. (citing Caribbean Community, Commonwealth Association of Tax Ad-
ministrators, Inter-American Centre of Tax Administrators, Intra-European Organiza-
tion of Tax Administrations, and Organization for Economic Cooperation as examples
of international organizations that could be utilized by reforming nations); see also
Spencer, supra note 124, at 35 (noting OECD's intention to continue dialogue with
cooperative jurisdictions to provide model mechanism for exchange of information,
examine types of additional assistance cooperative jurisdictions will need, and create
multilateral framework for consultations with cooperative jurisdictions).
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adverse economic effects that cooperative jurisdictions may en-
counter in the transition process of reforming their tax poli-
cies.205
b. Defensive Measures Against Non-Cooperative Tax Havens
Jurisdictions from the preliminary list that failed to make an
advance commitment or fail to make a scheduled commitment
will be deemed uncooperative and included in the OECD List of
Uncooperative Tax Havens. 20 6 This list, originally scheduled for
completion by July 31, 2001,207 will also include any advance
commitment jurisdiction or scheduled commitment jurisdiction
that has failed to meet its respective deadlines for eliminating
the harmful features of its tax systems due to a failure to act in
good faith with respect to its commitments.20 8 The Committee
encourages its member countries to refer to this uncooperative
list to identify jurisdictions against which retaliatory measures
should be undertaken.
20 9
Recognizing that a multilateral cooperative effort may bet-
ter curb harmful tax practices than any unilateral effort, the
Committee recommends a general scheme wherein member
countries can implement a unified approach. 20  This scheme
would facilitate the use of defensive measures by member coun-
tries against jurisdictions that do not reform their harmful tax
205. See 2000 REPORT, supra note 11, at 20-21 (stating that international organiza-
tions are encouraged to render assistance to jurisdictions reforming their tax systems);
see also Spencer, supra note 124, at 35 (noting 2000 Report's assertion that international
organizations are encouraged to assist in design of economic assistance programs).
206. See 2000 REPORT, supra note 11, at 18 (asserting that tax havens failing to
comply with OECD effort will be included on list of uncooperative tax havens); see also
Granski, supra note 120, at 9 (stating that OECD will publish list of uncooperative tax
havens).
207. See Michael M. Phillips, Accord is Reached by U.S. and Allies on Tax Havens, WALL
ST. J., June 28, 2001, at A4 (noting that OECD has changed its release date for list of
uncooperative tax havens from July 2001 to November 2001).
208. See 2000 REPORT, supra note 11, at 19 (stating that failure to act in good faith
to adhere to self-imposed timetable will result in inclusion on uncooperative tax haven
list).
209. See id. at 26 (noting that uncooperative list should be used to implement de-
fensive measures in lieu of preliminary list).
210. See id. at 24 (stating that OECD's objective is to coordinate joint effort be-
cause of limitations that exist with unilateral effort); see also Spencer, supra note 124, at
35 (noting OECD's assertion that coordinated effort of OECD member countries will
likely be more successful than unilateral approach).
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system.211 Each member country has discretion to implement or
not implement the defensive measures and adoption would be
pursuant to their domestic legislation or executed tax treaties. 2
Additionally, each member country may enforce any defensive
measure in proportion to the alleged harm done by a particular
jurisdiction.213
The defensive measures enumerated in the 2000 Report
contain some of the defensive measures from the 1998 Report as
well as additional measures recommended by the Forum." 4 The
Committee plans to evaluate these measures, approve its final
recommendations, and implement an applicable defensive strat-
egy.21 5 Subsequently, cooperating countries can adopt any of
the Committee's recommended measures to implement against
uncooperative jurisdictions.2 16
III. THE OECD'S COERCIVE AND DEVIANT EFFORT TO
COUNTERACT TAX COMPETITION
The OECD's 1998 and 2000 Reports addressing tax compe-
tition mark a coercive and intrusive solution that deviates from
traditional fiscal remedies y.2 1  The substantive provisions of
these reports are vague and subjectively reflect the exclusive in-
terests of the OECD. 21" Furthermore, success of the OECD's ef-
forts will result in hindering future global economic growth. 9
211. See 2000 REPORT, supra note 11, at 24 (stating that facilitated defensive mea-
sures are important to prevent uncooperative jurisdictions from gaining advantage over
cooperative jurisdictions); see also Spencer, supra note 124, at 35 (noting OECD's asser-
tion of facilitated ability to take counteractive measures with general framework).
212. See 2000 REPORT, supra note 11, at 24 (noting that OECD will not implement
defensive measures against uncooperative jurisdictions, as adopting measures will be up
to individual nations).
213. See id. (noting that affected nations are impacted differently by harmful tax
competition and may respond proportionally).
214. See id. at 24-25 (stating that potential measures from 1998 Report were
adopted for further study by Committee).
215. See id. (noting that defensive measures will be finalized after further review).
216. See id. (noting that affected nations will be able to adopt any finalized mea-
sures they choose to utilize against uncooperative nations).
217. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (noting that treaties are traditional
method to address international fiscal issues because of ability to resolve common issues
of multiple nations without usurping their national fiscal sovereignty).
218. See supra notes 121, 136, 152, 152, 181-82 and accompanying text (acknowl-
edging that OECD failed to consult with non-member nations and vaguely and subjec-
tively analyzed tax systems of nations alleged to engage in harmful tax competition).
219. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text (discussing that tax competi-
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A. OECD's Effort Deviates From Traditional
International Taxation Principles
Notwithstanding the substantive findings of the OECD in
the 1998 and 2000 Reports, their efforts to curb tax competition
marks a substantial deviation from the treaty network established
to address international fiscal problems and usurps a basic tenet
of fiscal legislation: national sovereignty. 220 The 1998 Report re-
quires tax competitive jurisdictions to alter their fiscal legislation
and accompanying practices. 221 Although the OECD claims that
adoption of these fiscal reform Recommendations are volun-
tary222, the threat of targeted jurisdictions being subjected to the
defensive measures outlined in the 2000 Report effectively co-
erces these jurisdictions into an involuntary compliance. 223
Consideration of the economic disparity between OECD na-
tions and targeted jurisdictions is demonstrative. The OECD is a
group of the most industrialized and economically powerful na-
tions in the world. 2 4 Collectively, the nations of the OECD mo-
nopolize the production of global goods and the allocation of
capital and resources.2 25 Thus, the OECD members are an indis-
pensable part of the global economy, able to leverage their mo-
nopolistic economic position in global affairs.
Conversely, the tax competitive nations targeted by the
OECD are much weaker economically and more dependent on
OECD nations as trading partners. 226 Tax competitive nations'
tion allows developing nations to internally develop economically, and such internal
development, allows for more effective global economic growth).
220. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text (stating that nations have main-
tained their fiscal sovereignty notwithstanding increasing effect of national systems on
international economic relations).
221. See supra note 159 and accompanying text (noting that OECD's Recommen-
dations require modifications to targeted jurisdiction's fiscal legislation and practices).
222. See supra note 204 and accompanying text (noting OECD's assertion that
member countries have discretion in choosing whether or not to adopt defensive mea-
sures).
223. See supra notes 111, 172 and accompanying text (discussing developing na-
tion's dependence on income from financial services and OECD's defensive measures
attempting to curtail developing nation's tax-incentive-based financial services indus-
try).
224. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (illustrating that OECD includes
most major industrialized nations).
225. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing dominance of OECD
nations in production of goods and services).
226. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (stating lack of natural resources
and capital to internally build economy).
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lack of resources and labor requires such jurisdictions to seek
goods and resources from the more industrialized nations of the
OECD. 227 This reliance precludes tax competitive jurisdictions
from effectively generating sufficient internal revenue to de-
velop a globally competitive economy.228  Consequently, this
weaker and more reliant position of tax competitive nations
hardly places them in any position to refuse the OECD's mono-
polizing demands.
The OECD attempts to rationalize infringing on developing
nations' sovereign right to tax by stating that such a right also
confers upon the OECD nations the right to protect their reve-
nue bases.229 This argument, however, does not accurately re-
flect the effect of the OECD's effort. Although the implementa-
tion of the Recommendations and defensive measures of the
1998 and 2000 Reports may allow OECD member nations to pro-
tect their respective revenue bases, a concurrent effect is a tres-
pass on fiscal sovereignty. 2 ° The 1998 and 2000 Reports effec-
tively dictate legislative and practice reforms targeted jurisdic-
tions must enact,231  thus violating international taxation
principles.
The OECD's coercive trespass on national fiscal sovereignty
deviates from the traditional fiscal remedial system of tax trea-
ties.23 2 Throughout the rise of internationalization and the re-
sulting problems of double taxation and tax evasion, treaties
constituted the measures used to address these issues. 233 Nations
maintained control of their fiscal authority and this allowed for
227. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text (discussing developing nation's
lack of natural resources and consequential dependence on developed nations for pro-
duced goods).
228. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text (noting developing nations'
reliance on finance and services because of lack of natural resources to enable thriving
manufacturing industry).
229. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
230. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (discussing defensive measures
contemplated by OECD, which require developing nations to involuntarily alter their
tax legislation, thus infringing on national sovereignty).
231. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (listing reform measures to na-
tions' fiscal policies, such as requiring comprehensive information reporting and adopt-
ing CFC legislation).
232. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text (discussing that treaties are tradi-
tional method for addressing international fiscal issues without infringing on national
fiscal sovereignty).
233. See supra notes 57, 60 and accompanying text (noting prevailing use of taxa-
tion treaties in addressing double taxation and tax evasion).
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effective negotiations regarding international fiscal issues.23 4
The OECD's effort essentially undermines a nation's ability
to negotiate. By leveraging their dominant economic power,235
the OECD member nations are usurping the fiscal authority of
tax competitive nations. Because treaty-negotiating power is a
reflection of a nation's effective fiscal authority, 23 6 this usurpa-
tion of fiscal authority results in a nation's lack of treaty negotiat-
ing power, thus rendering such agreement attempts fruitless.
Although the reluctance of tax competitive jurisdictions to
enter into tax evasion treaties237 made these agreements less ef-
fective than double taxation treaties, the lack of success of tax
evasion treaties can be rectified by the willingness of OECD
member nations to compromise in negotiating these treaties.
Tax evasion treaties can be more effective and amenable if in-
dustrialized nations agree to tax-sparing arrangements. 238 These
arrangements would enable tax competitive jurisdictions to
maintain their respective influx of investments from non-resi-
dent taxpayers. 239 Also, OECD member nations would likely re-
ceive the reciprocal benefit of tax enforcement assistance by the
tax competitive jurisdictions. Thus, tax-sparing arrangements
are likely the best solution to appease both tax competitive coun-
tries and the OECD member nations.
B. OECD Reports Are Vague and Subjective
The fundamental make-up of the OECD illustrates the or-
ganization's inappropriate position in leading this effort. The
OECD is comprised of only twenty-nine countries, 240 thus repre-
234. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing national preference for
using tax treaties to address international fiscal issues due to treaties' lack of infringe-
ment on national sovereignty).
235. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (discussing OECD's ability to com-
bat tax competition with both tax and non-tax measures because of economic power
disparity between OECD nations and developing nations).
236. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (stating that nation's fiscal sover-
eignty is maintained through negotiating position).
237. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (noting developing countries reluc-
tance to enter into tax evasion treaties because of detrimental economic effects that
result).
238. See supra notes 67-68 (noting beneficial effect of tax-sparing arrangements to
developing countries).
239. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (noting appeal of tax-sparing provi-
sions to foreign investors that invest in developing nations).
240. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (listing OECD member countries).
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senting a limited scope of global interests. This scope is further
reduced when accounting for the abstentions by Luxembourg
and Switzerland during the approval of the 1998 Report by the
OECD Council. 4 ' Consequently, the 1998 and 2000 Reports
utilize an OECD-centered approach that significantly omits a
substantial number of interests in the world, especially those of
the targeted nations.
Moreover, the OECD's failure to solicit design schemes for
domestic tax regimes from non-member nations,2 4 2 further dem-
onstrates its self-centered focus in curbing tax competition. Al-
though the 1998 Report recommends establishing the Forum, in
part to facilitate dialogue between member and non-member na-
tions, no effective consultations with tax havens occurred during
the drafting of the 1998 Report.24 3 In fact, such failure to con-
sult with these affected jurisdictions contributed to the absten-
tion of Luxembourg during the approval of the 1998 Report.24 4
Although the OECD claims to represent world interests by
having open discussions, the Forum's dialogue with non-mem-
ber and tax haven jurisdictions following publication of the 1998
Report consisted of consulting with jurisdictions on complying
with the OECD-established principles of the 1998 Report and ac-
knowledging those jurisdictions that agreed to comply.245 Thus,
the only level of participation by non-OECD countries was to ei-
ther comply with the 1998 Report or to refuse. As stated by the
OECD,24 6 addressing the issue of tax competition would require
a coordinated global approach, which should include the proac-
tive and substantive input of all affected nations.
In addition to being too OECD-centered, the 1998 and 2000
241. See supra note 121 and accompanying text (noting abstentions by Switzerland
and Luxembourg during approval process).
242. See supra note 121 and accompanying text (noting that input for 1998 Report
excluded non-OECD member nations).
243. See supra note 121 and accompanying text (discussing Luxembourg's absten-
tion from approving 1998 Report due to OECD's failure to consult non-OECD na-
tions).
244. See supra note 121 and accompanying text (noting Luxembourg's abstention
during OECD's approval of 1998 Report due to lack of effective consultation with
targeted nations).
245. See supra note 167 and accompanying text (noting that assisting targeted juris-
dictions to comply with Recommendations of 1998 Report is purpose of consultations
with Forum).
246. See supra notes 142, 202 and accompanying text (noting OECD's assertion
that cooperative global effort will better address tax competition).
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Reports are also vague.24 7 In determining whether ajurisdiction
has an appropriate tax rate, as opposed to low or nominal, the
1998 Report fails to provide an exact figure or tax range that
would be considered appropriate.24 8 Additionally, the 1998 Re-
port fails to provide comparative guidelines to determine ifjuris-
dictions are engaged in harmful tax competition in the context
of their respective economic situations. 9  Furthermore, the tax
haven requirement of no substantial activities has no determina-
tive guidelines, and is vague enough to allow an OECD nation to
subjectively determine what is 'substantial.' 25" Thus, the OECD's
effort outlined in the 1998 and 2000 Reports provides no con-
structive assistance to guide alleged competitive jurisdictions to
unilaterally reform their respective tax systems.
C. OECD's Effort Will Stymie Global Economic Growth
The OECD's effort to curb tax competition is likely to hin-
der overall global economic development. Inherently, interna-
tional taxation principles foster growth through international
trade. 251 Tax treaties alleviate the encumbered movement of
capital, goods, and services that result from the harmful effects
of double taxation.252 Additionally, national tax systems provide
tax incentives to business enterprises in an effort to encourage
their international development. 253 These characteristics of in-
ternational taxation enhance the profitability of international
trade and allow developing nations to participate in the growth
247. See supra notes 121, 136, 152, 152, 181-82 and accompanying text (discussing
failure of OECD to set specific tax rate criteria for identifying tax havens and harmful
preferential tax regimes, failure to distinguish between harmful and beneficial tax com-
petition jurisdictions, and failure to analyze targeted nations' tax policies in context of
their particular circumstances).
248. See supra notes 136, 152, 152, 181-82 and accompanying text (discussing
OECD's failure to specifically state inappropriate tax rates).
249. See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text (discussing OECD's lack of con-
textual analysis in listing nations that are alleged to possess harmful preferential tax
regimes).
250. See supra note 149 and accompanying text (noting OECD's concern of adding
value to tax haven jurisdiction, but not denoting quantitative criteria defining 'substan-
tial').
251. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing importance of tax trea-
ties in eliminating barriers to global trade).
252. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing double taxation's hin-
drance of international transactions).
253. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text (discussing tax haven's inten-
tion to attract foreign capital and investment).
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of the global economy. 254
Although the industrialized nations argue that their de-
pleted tax revenue resulting from the effects of tax competition
diminishes the amount of aid provided to developing nations,255
effective and sustainable economic development is most benefi-
cial when it is internally generated. 256 Tax competition allows
developing nations to build their economies without relying on
subsidies of more industrialized nations.257 Increased economic
independence will potentially allow for more input on global ec-
onomic policy.25
8
Because competition, on many scales, is characteristic of the
free market global economy, tax haven jurisdictions are appro-
priately addressing the need to develop their respective econo-
mies. Due to a lack of natural resources and capital, alleged tax
haven jurisdictions are at a significant disadvantage compared to
industrialized nations in their ability to contribute to the global
economy.259 Consequently, the only recourse for these jurisdic-
tions is to provide investment incentives to individuals and mul-
tinational corporations in an effort to develop a financial indus-
try that is vital to their success.260 These jurisdictions, in turn,
will be able to develop a stable and growing economy that will
provide for the development and improvement of the necessary
infrastructure to allow their health care and educational systems
to become commensurate with those of more industrialized na-
tions.
Additionally, this economic growth is likely to result in
254. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (discussing ability of corporations
to transact business in nations with favorable tax rates enabled by national fiscal sover-
eignty).
255. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (discussing developed nations'
preference to continue aid and debt support to developing nations).
256. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (discussing more independent and
sustainable economic development results from nations' ability to internally generate
income).
257. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (discussing ability of developing
nations to internally generate financial services income that would reduce developing
nations' reliance on current aid and debt they receive from more developed nations).
258. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (noting increased economic inde-
pendence of developing nations would enable more input regarding global economic
affairs).
259. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (discussing poor natural resources,
labor, and capital).
260. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (discussing developing nations' de-
pendence on bank and finance to stimulate economic growth).
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growing markets for products and services of the industrialized
nations.2 61 The dominating trade positions of the United States
and fellow OECD members can offset the loss of fiscal revenue
with the increase of export gains that is likely to result from the
increasing strength of these developing economies. 26 2 It is in-
deed ironic that this effort comes at a time when the United
States, the OECD's most economically powerful member and
perhaps most affected by tax competition, maintains its status as
a dominant global exporter.263
CONCLUSION
The OECD's effort to curb tax competition marks a devia-
tion of accepted international taxation principles. The substan-
tive criteria and defensive measures to be employed againstjuris-
dictions unwilling to comply with the OECD's demands illus-
trates a coercive attempt to alter the tax systems of these
jurisdictions to conform with the unilateral interests of OECD
member nations. Additionally, the overall consequence of this
effort is likely to hinder global economic development as it will
concentrate the benefits of globalizing trends into the hands of a
few nations and move further away from a potential level of pro-
portional economic standing among all nations of the world.
261. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (discussing economic growth of
developing nations facilitated by tax competition that may lead to increased consump-
tion of goods and services of leading export nations of OECD).
262. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (reasoning increase in market for
goods and services of developed nations stemming from strengthened economies of
developing nations).
263. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (noting United States' dominant
position as global exporter).
258
